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OP DELAWARE, 



IN 



THE SENATS OF THE UNXTED STATES, 



ON THE 



FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 

IN REPLY TO MR. GRUNDY OF TENNESSEE, MR. WOODBURY OF NEW 
( HAMPSHIRE, AND 6THEFiS; 



THE 



IlESOLUTION OF MR. FOOT, OF CONNECTICUT, 
RKING UNDER CONSIDERATION. 



■ *■ zs. . 



M3aBt)infltort : 



PRINTED AND PUBLl3lir,D AT THE OFFtCF 
OF THE NAllUNAL JOURNAf 



1 S.?rv. 



(^.^^'4 






•By Bxchangro 
New York Pub. L.iby. 
MAR 2 8 1934 



SPEECH OF MK. CLAVTOIN, 

df DELAIVARE. 
IN SENATE UiNflTED STATES.-March 4, I83l>, 



The motion lor the inde6nite postponement of the 
resolution of Mr. Foot of Connecticut, relative to the 
Public Lands, being under consideration, 

Mr. Clayton of Delaware, addressed the Chair. 

Mr. President : If I need an apology for discussing topics extrinsic CT 
not strictly relevant to the subject of the resolution before us^ I shall find it 
ia the example of honorable gentlemeo, who, in going before me, have 
availed themselves, by general consent, of an opportunity to debate qq 
this motion, the full merits of other questions of momentous interest (ij 
cur country. While the argument was of a sectional character, and chiefly 
calculated to excite personal and local feeling, I desired no participation io 
it. But, although generally averse to any deviation from the ordinary 
rules of Parliamentary proceed iiig, and unwilling to originate any new 
subject of controversy even in ihe boundless latitude given to this diicus- 
sioD, I cannot be silent wliile principles are boldly advanced and presseJ 
upon us, (no matter how inapiilicable or inappropriate they may appear.) 
which in my judgment are s ibversive of the interests of this nation, or 
hostile to the spirit of the Fednial Constitution. 

The resolution of the honorable Senator from Connecticut has noibiug 
imperative in its character, li lays down uo new principle, and proposes 
no ufw course of legislation ; but simply asks an inquiry into the expe- 
diency of either hastening the sales of the public domain, or of stopping tbo 
surveys for a limited period. The committee to whom the inquiry is pro 
posed to be entrusted, is composed of five member^-,* all of whom are 
Representatives of States within whose limits are contiiined large portions 
of the public lauds. Seeing in this fact a suflicient refutation of tbe ob- 
jection that this inquiry may create uauccessary alarm in the WesI— cnrtt- 

iMessrj. Barton of .%riJouri, Chairman, rivlirgjton of Louiiiau», KaBC (rf Illiflol?, 
EHli of MissisBlppi, aiid McKink^ of AlaJama, 



(dining (he same coiiuJeoce io (he honcr^ble meiubers of tiiat CuuiiDiUec 
which o(hers have professed — believing tha( the suhjec( proposeii to be re- 
ferred to them is important to the country, and that by the adoption of the reso* 
lulion we may be furnished with an interesting document in their report, my 
own vote will be given against the motion fui indefinite postponement. I agree 
with my honorable friend from Massachusetts (Mr. WVbster) that ihe com. 
mittee may investigate the whole subject without any express instructions. 
Bj (he rules of the Senate, they already have full jurisdiction over the mat- 
ter. But after all the discussion which has been tlicitfd by the mere pro- 
position to instruct them to inquire, it is not probable that the committee 
will do so without some further intimation from the Senate that a report oa 
(bis subject would be acceptable. I cannot agree with the bonorablo Ser.' 
ator from New Hampshire, (Mr. Woodbury,) tiiat the motion to postpone 
is calculated or intended to prevent a distinct expression of opinion on the 
subject : on the contrary, the postponement of tne resolution, after discus- 
sion, would announce to the committee our indisposition to have the in- 
quiry made during the present session. The Senator from Connecticut, 
(Mr. Foot,) who desires this information, and whose deportment here is dis- 
tinguished for urbanity and courtesy to others, may be indulged without any 
apprehension of exciting unnecessary alarm in the West, while our refusal 
to adopt any measure to throw light on the subject may, possibly, create 
suspicion in other parts of our country, that we are wasting this portion of 
th« nation's treasure, and are afraid that our profligacy may be exposed by 
this investigation. 

I proceed now, sir, to a brief examination of wliat I conceite to have 
been the origin of this protracted and discursive debate. We have a bill 
on our files entitled, a bill " to graduate the price of the public lands, to 
make provision for actual settlors, and to cede the refuse upon equitable 
terms, and for meritorious objects, to the States in which they lie" — the 
same, sir, which has been alluded to by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. 
Benton) under the designation of" my graduation bill." When the gentle- 
man from South Carolina (Mr. IlayneJ first addiessed the Senate on the 
resolution before us, I understood him to have pressed it as a measure of ex- 
pediency, that the public lands should be sold to the Slate^ within whose 
limits they are situated, for a nominal consideration. The gentleman after- 
wards corrected this impression when his colleague (Mr. Smith of S. C.) 
declared that he also so understood him. Sir, the gentleman has the right 
to claim of us all that his statements should be properly represented. I 
now understand him to say that his proposition is not to cede away these 
lauds for a nominal consideration, but to sell them on such liberal terms 
that revenue should not be even a secondary object in the sale. lie urged 
with all his usual ability the impolicy of even considering them as a source 
oi rev^Que. Sir, if I now comprehend all this doctrine, it has for its object 



\o iiukeiU)pie6oious winch shall secure a fuvnrab^e vote on liiis btiiuegrauau- 
(ioa bill ; and, if so, I dissent from the doctrine toto calo. Whether this were 
or were not the preai object of the debate, with the gentleman from South 
Carolina, it was plainly avowed to have been a motive for i( by the iSenator 
irova Missouri, (Mr. Benton,) in the view which he toolc of the subject. Tho 
bill referred to proposes to limit the prices of these lands at once, to one 
dollar per acre, and then gradually to reduce those prices at the rate of 
twenty-five per cent, per annum, until the lands shall be ofiered, after tho 
expiration of the third year, at twenty-five cents per acre. It further pro- 
poses to sell lands to actual settlers, whether trespassers or not, at gradually 
reduced prices, until, after the expiration of the third year, they are to receive 
thcno at five cents per acre. Ii that miserable pittance bo not then paid, it pro- 
poses to cede eighty acres to every such settler, "without the payment ofany 
consideration, and as a donation" — and finally, by the terrasofit allthelanda 
which shall remain not disposed of by these means at the end of five yoarS; 
are to be given to the States in which they lie upon these conditions merely- 
thai Ihey shall apply them to the promotion of education and internal improve 
oient at home, and refund to the Government the expenses ot the surveys 
of the lands so ceded, at the rate of two hundred and sixteen dollars for 
each township of twenty-three thousand acres. In consequence of the en- 
actment of such a law, probably very little would be bougiit until tbe expi- 
ration of the third year, when, if ihe interference of these Slates with a view 
to secure the whole to themselves for nothing, should not prevent (he sales 
altogether, the lands would be purchased at a nominal price. Such a mea> 
sure, sir, would not only be unjust to the citizens of the old Stales, 
but highly injurious to the Western setilers who have heretofore 
bought lands at a full and fair consideration. The value of properl}' 
is merely relative, and is either enhanced or diminished by the estimate* 
placed upon other property of the same kind. If a hundred millions of 
acres be thrown into market at twenty-five cents per acre, and a large 
quantity of land be ofiered to actual settlers at the same time at five cents 
per acre, the value of that which has been bought by fair purchasers 
at two dollars, or at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, is at once, 
other circumstances being equal, suuk to a level with the selling price of 
all the lands around it. We well know the operation upon our real pro- 
pert}', in all parts of the Union, of the exposure at public sale of any verj? 
considerable portion of real property adjoining it. We know that if 
a great landed proprietor sells me a tract in (he midst of his posscssioos at 
fifty dollars per acre, and then, from pecuniary embarrassinent or frona «ny 
other cause, exposes the residue to sale, by which he realizes only five do!» 
lars per acre for lands of equal fertility and advantages, my land, as an ef- 
lect of this, is reduced to his last selling price. When he puts a million of acres 
around mine into market at b nominal sum, he equally diminishes the selling 



value ot uiine by liie act, whei'ner ins motive lor lioin^ iii Uo Ui tujg,uieii? 
population, and improve the country, or waQlonI> to elTeci aiy ruio. And 
should this bill become a law, the former purchasers who have paid fuU 
value would, in consequence of the depreciation of the properly occdsioiV' 
ed by the enactment, have a belter equitable right to remuneratioo for lossea 
by the Guvernment, than many claimants whose demands are annually liqui- 
dated here without our hearing a note of remonstrance against them. This bill 
has bnen pending here for the last four years ; and the disposition evinced 
to entertain it as a subject for future decision, has cherished expectations 
which aie sedulously encouraged by rumors in the West, that its provisions 
will eventually be adopted. If my information be correct, and Westerc 
gentlemen near me can bear witness that it ie so, anticipations have be«0 
too generally indulged that these lands will, before long, be offered for 
nothing. This must tend to impede our sales, and perhaps to some 
extent to suspend the settlement of our Western frontier — a restHt I sup*- 
pose to be deprecated by none more deeply than by the gentleman from 
JMissduri (Mr. Benton) himself.K In the meantime, without thf final actioo 
of Congress on the subject, the illusion is every year increa*ing ; and, to 
add to th- evil, we have now a new doctiine which has been already ad- 
verted to in this debate — that these lands of right belong to the new Stales 
within which they are situated. The gentleman from Missouri, in refereoca 
to the charge of hostility to the West, to prove or disprove which I would not 
mystif now offer a single remark, has chosen to inform us that he has never 
obtained here more than a single vole for his graduation bill from the repre- 
sentatives of all the States northeast of the Potomac — and he adds, thai 
vote was given in 1828 by a former Senator from the State which 1 have 
the honor in part to represent here. For this good deed, the gentleman 
from Missouri proceeded to pronounce a panegyric on that Senator, 
which was merited on stronger grounds. Though readily according 
in the justice which imputes the most correct motives to that genilenrjao, 
who is ray neighbor, and with whom I live on terms of friendly iutercours^j 
exercising as he doubtless did his conscientious judgment on the case, yet 
w-ith my viesvs, thus brielly explained, I am constrained to say that I can« 
not vote for this bill. According to my mode of considering it, it is a pro- 
position to give away the birthright of our people for a nominal sum ; and 
I am yet to learn that the citizens of the Middle States have indicated any 
feeling in regard to it differing from that expressed in the vote referred to, 
when, with a single exception, all the Senators representing States north 
of Mason's and Dixon's line, opposed the measure. They do not look to 
tbesf lands, us has been unjustly stated, with the eye of an unfeeling land- 
holder who parts with his acres as a raiser pans with his gold. Tbcy view 
the new Stati s as younger sisters in the same family, upon an equal footing 
^ith themselves, and entitled to an equal iAare of their fatrimony; bu; 



ba-vnng children to educate, and numerous wants to be supplied, ilipy wiU 
fbink it ungenerous, unjust, and oppressive, should these youngrr sisters 
fake away the lokole. Sir, it is the inheritance which descended from our 
forefathers who wrested a part of it from the British crown at the expense 
of their blood and treasure, and paid for the rest of it by the earnings of 
their labour. It is not for me to say what are the feelings of the people of 
tlie Middle States on this subject. It is their privilege to speak for tht- m- 
selves, and they will doubtless, when they think it necessary, » xercise that 
privilege. But I will s^y, that if they entertain the seniiments of their 
fathers, they will never consent to cede away hundreds ol millions of acres 
of land for a nominal consideration, or gratuitously relinquish them to any 
Dew State, however loudly she may insist on the measure as due to her 
rights ond her sovereignty, or however boldly she may threaten to defy the 
Federal Judiciary, and decide theconlroversy by her own tribunals, in her 
own favor. Those who are conversant with our revoluliouary history, will 
remember that the exclusive claims of Virginia and of other members of 
our political family, to the public lands, were warmly resisted by the Slates 
of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, as soon as those claims were 
avowed after the rupture with the mother country. The articles of Con- 
federation were not signed on the part of New Jersey until the 25th of No- 
vember, 177s, although she had bled freely in the cause of American 
libfrty from the commencement of the struggle. One of the principal objec- 
tions which caused this delay in the ratification of those articles will be 
found in the able representation of her Legislature, presented by her De- 
legates to Congress, before she acceded to the Union. " The ninth article," 
said they, " provides that no State shall be deprived of territory for the 
^renefit of the United States. Whether we are to understand that by fer- 
rjtory is irit»'nded any land, the property of which was heretofore vested in 
the crown of Great Britain, or that no mention of such land is made in 
tba Confederation, we are constrained to observe that the present war, as 
we always apprehended, was undertaken for the general defence and in- 
inest of the confederating Colonies, now the United States. It was ever 
the confident expectation of this State, that the benefits derived from a 
successful contest were to be general and proportionate ; and that the pro- 
perty of the common enemy, failing in consequence of a prosperous issue 
of the war, would belong to the United States, and be appropriated to their 
use. We are therefore greatly disappointed in finding no provision made 
io the Confederation for empowering the Congress to dispose of such pro- 
perty, but especially the vacant and unpatented lands, cnmmonly called 
the crown lands, for defraying the expenses of the war, and for such other 
public end general purposes. The jurisdiction ought, in every instance, to 
belong to the respective Slates within the charter or determiued limits of 
'^•Bi^.h siTcTi hvii$ may be seated : but reason and justice must decide, that 



the property which existed in the crown of Great Britain, previous to ili(> 
presrnt revoluiion, ought now to belong to the Congress in trust for the use 
and benefit of the United States. They have fought and bled for it in pro- 
portion to their respective abilities ; and therefore the rcicard ought not to 
be predilfciinnally distributed.'' And when in November, 1778, the Le- 
gislature uf New Jersey determined to attach her to the Union, they did 
it, as they then expressed, " in firm reliance that the candor and justice of 
tbeb-evera! States would, in due time, remove the subsislinginequality," yet 
still insisting on the justice of their objections then "lately stated and sent 
to the General Congress." So too Delaware and Maryland, for the sarae 
reasons, refused to join the Confederation until a still later period, the for- 
mer ratifying the articles on the 22d of February, 1779, and the latter on the 
Isl of March, 1781. The State which I have the honor in part to represent 
here had, on the 1st of February 1799, adopted the following resolutions 
to authorize her accession to the Union : 

" Resolved, That this State considers it necessary for the peace and safe- 
ty of the State to be included in the Union ; that a moderate extent of 
limits should be assigned for such of those States as claim to the Mississippi 
or South Sea ; and that the United States, in Congress asfemblcd, should 
and ought to have power of fixing their Western limits. 

" Resolved also, That this State considers lierst-lf justly entitled to a right, 
in common with the mf-mbers of the Union, to that extensive tract of country 
which lies to the westward of the frontiers of the United States, the pioperty 
of which was not vested in or granted to individuals at the commencement ot 
the present war ; that the same hath been or may be gained from the King of 
Great Britain or the native Indians, by the blood and treasure of all, and 
oucht therefore to be a common estate to be granted out on terms beneficial 
to the Unit»d States." 

But after the accession of Delaware with this protest, Maryland stilt 
persevered in her refusal to join the Confederation, solely on the ground 
'* that she might thereby be stripped of the common interest and the common 
benefits derivable iVom the Western lands." She still insisted that some secu- 
rity for these lands was necessary for the happiness and tranquillity of the. 
Union, denied the whole claim of Virginia to the territory northwest of the 
Ohio, and still pressed upon Congress "that policy and justice required, that 
■* country unsettled at the commencement of the war, claimed by the British 
crown and ceded to it by the treaty of Paris, if wrested from the common ene- 
my by the blood and treasure of the thirteen States, should be considered as 
comrnun property." In February, 1780, New York made her cession to 
accelerate the Federal alliance, and declared the territory ceded should be 
for the use and benefit of such of the United States as should become mem- 
bers of that alliance, " and for no other use or purpose whaterer." And 
•il^hough Virgini;» attempted f^r a while to vindirate her cfaim, yet rvther 







.iJ.iles, reeling a stronjj atlachnicnt t(i IMaryluiiiJ, and conscious of u»e jus 
lice of her rfjiiesenliilioDS, disliked a partial union which would ihrow out 
of the pale a pooph- stHndinc;, as Rlarylandi^rs have always stood, among tho 
bravest and most pntridtic of our countrymen. The ordinance of Congress 
then followed in Oclolier, I?80, declaring that the territory to be ceded by 
the States should be. disposed of for the common benefit of the Union, and 
on the 2d of January, 1781, Virginia, in that spirit of magnanimity which has 
generally prevailed in her councils, yiefded up her claim for the benefit of 
the whole Union, It is a remarkable circumstance that Maryland did nor 
^dually join the Union until after these cessions had been made by New York 
and Virgmia, declaring at the very moment, and by the very terms of heir 
accession, that she " did not release, nor intend to relinquish, any part of 
her right and interest, with the other confederating Slates, to the western 
territory." These facts, which have now become a part of the familiar his- 
tory of the country, furnish curious reminiscencvs in these latter days, when 
a new light has broken in upon us to show that the new States have litle 
to all the lands uiihin their chartered limits, and when we arc told it would 
be most magnanimous and becoming in us, who claim to have imbibed the 
spirit and sentiments of our forefathers, to cede away our patrimon}' for a 
nominal consideration. Let it be remembered that the feeling on ihis sub- 
ject manifested by ihe two States of Delaware and Maryland", preventing 
their accession to the cotif'-deralion until so late a period, was with difTiculty 
repressed, even by that ardent attachment to the cause of liberty for which 
they were tlien so much distinguished, and in v/hich they have never been 
surpassed. Their troops went through the whole contest together, flankinti 
and sopjjorting each other in battle ; co'i'nmonly led on by the same Con>- 
n^ander; geneislly the first to advance and the last to retreat, their bayonets, 
like the pikes of the Macedonian phalanx, always glittering in front of one 
and the same compact mass; and .nht-n they fell, they slept in death 
together on the same part of the blood-stained field. It was that sam^ 
spirit which prompted the combined exertions of these people in the Aoir* 
rican cause throughout the whole struggle, which also united them in tl eir 
resistance against every attempt on the part of any single section of the 
country lo appropriate for its exclusive benofit the territory which ihry 
were striving to conquer from the British Crown. Sir, I think they will 
now combine again; I think they will, when considering this subj'.ft, bestow 
some reflection upon the millions which have b^en expended in the subse- 
quent purchase of the Southwestern portion of our public domain, on the 
sums whirl) invc been profusely litvished in makinn md carrying into r fleet 
our lif itifs for the extinguishment of the, Indian title, in making the surveys 
of those lands, and in the payment of <>flicers and ag: nts for ihe mainten- 
ance (if our land system. From the ftcling which f«jrmeily actuated them, 
' !od.|e that their co-operation en this suhjoci will b" su'*h as to resist everv 



10 

tfluit lo bribe ihem vviili premises, or lo sway liieni by means ol poluicai 
excitement to give up that which could not be wrested Irom them by ap- 
peals to ilieir strongest attachments in ihe daikest days r;f their adversity. 
They will claim, I think, Sir, an equal portion of iliis territory under the 
plain letter of >he grants referred to — they may claim a large portion ofit by 
(he paramount liile of the right of conquest, which has nevfr been by them 
relinquished ; and by ihaf title thf^y can succtssfully defend it. Whatever 
foundation there may be for the imputation of motives in other sections of 
the Union, to llaller and to woo the V> fsl by tlie oiler to her of this splen- 
did dowry if she will transfer her influerce to a candidate in a Presidential 
election, we, I believe, shall not take part in any such bargain. The gen- 
ileman from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) says the West has been already 
wooed and wor>. It may be so, but we are not, and I think shall never be, 
sub pottstatt viri, and if we could be bought for any consideration to sign 
this release of our birth-right, we should never a^ree, like Esau, to sell it 
for a mess of pottage. 

I come now, Sir, to consider a subject which has been discussed in con - 
nection with this — the right of a Stale to regulate her conduct by the judg- 
ment of her own self-constituted tribunals, upon the validity of an act of 
Congress in opposition to the solemn decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States : and my remaiks upon it will be chiefly in reply to gentle- 
ruen who have gone before me. I confess 1 do not discover why the power 
of deciding any, and every question, growing out of any circumstances in 
which a Stale may conceive her sovereignty impugned, is not liauslattd lo 
hei' own tribunals by the same train of argument which induces the conclu- 
sion that she may nullify an act of fbe Federal Legislature without the aid of 
the Federal Judiciary. We know — we are so taught by memorials on our 
files — that the doctrine is very current in some States of the West, that the 
public territory within their limits is their own ; and we have been threa- 
tened that when the pcpulation llowiog westward has transltrred the 
balance of power beyond the Alleghany, or when, as one in this -debate has 
phrased it, " the sceptre has departed from the old tliirteen forever," wo 
shall find the rights of the new Slates asserted and maintained, if not by the 
force of numbers here, at least by the force of arms at home. In th »t case, 
too, it is said, that to us distance will Le defeat. Stale sovereignty and 
Slate rights constitute the very war cry of a new party in this country. I 
would myself be niiiong the last to iniViuf^e upon the constitutional powers 
of the States. Cut how far will the now doctrines on ihe subject carry 
us ? Some who have cngai^ed in this discussion have avowed the opinion 
ihal our claim to the public lands is inconsisient with the paramount rights 
of Western States, and th<il upon the fundamental principles of government, 
the doiuain within their chartert d limits is ihe properly of these new grantco. 
Others who 5l:uul amonij the I>oldest champions of the principle t'.ml u 



u 

sovereign State may conslitulionally and lawfully enforce lier declarations 
against the validity of an act of Congress, and nullify it whenever by 
her judgment it is " deliberately, plainly, and palpably unconstitutional,'' 
repudiate the whole doctrine of State supremacy, and State title, when 
we touch these claims to the public lands. The rule works badly then. 
The two positions assumed by the same reasoner are repugnant to each 
other. You cannot claim by virtue of your State sovereignty to nullify an 
act of Congress, and yet deny to another State the right by a similar opera, 
tinn to tear out of your statute book tlie leaf containing the Virginia grant, 
as well as that whicli bears upon it the act of Congress declaring the uses of 
that grant. By the grant and the act, the estate ceded is " for the com- 
mon benefit." The new sovereigns, within whose dominions the estate is 
situated, asserting their power to decide all questions which, in their jadg- 
TTient, touch their sovereignty, niay nullify both, and make the land theirs; 
or if they cannot, how can any otiier of these sovereigns nullify a tarifflaw 
or an act for internal improvement, which the Federal Judiciary adjudges 
to be valid ! The gentleman from Tennessee says he will admit that the 
Soprerae Coort is the final arbiter in all cases in law and equity arising 
under the Constitution, and the laws of the United States marfe tn pt/r- 
suance oj it. But I am not satisfied with this limitation. The words of 
the Constitution are, " the Judicial power of the United States shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may, from time to time, ordain and establish." Then this general transfer 
of power is e.X|)Iainf-d by the second section of the same article : " The 
judicial*power shall extend to all cases in law or equity arising under 
this Constitution, the laws of the United Slnies, and treatirs mad*", or 
which shall be made, under their authority ; to all cases affecting Am- 
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ; to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States rhallhe 
a parti/ ; to controversies between two or more Slates, between a State and 
citizpns of another State, "between citizens of different States, between 
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and 
betwpen a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or sub. 
jects." All these words of the deed are in full force, except so far as it lias 
been altered by the single amendatory article to prevent suits against one of 
the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of 
any foreign State. The instrument then contains no qualific.ition of the 
judicial power rpstrictiiig its exercise to cases arising out of laws made in 
pirrsuanre of the constitution. 

The reservation is an inadvertent interpolation in the instrument, and the 
power granted extends to laws of the United States, whether Constitutionally 
or unconstitutinnaly enacted. It will be seen, too, that the United States must 
"//r n portv tn rnntrnrrrsirs" ronrerning a tariff law. as wel! as to ihfr^'" 



.*uicli aflecl llie ri;^tii lo the public uoaviin, or auy olher quesiiou tuuciui);: 
Staio sovereignty ; and tliat if there be i»o authority iu the iastrunieut by 
which the judicial power can be extf nded to the former class of controver- 
siHS, there h none lo extend it lo the latter class, or any case which a single 
State mav consiiler as presenting an infraction of her own powers. The 
gentleman I'rotn Kfotucky (Mr. Rownn) andoiher Senators have contend- 
ed that a Slate cannot surrend^-r any portion of h>-r s >vcreignty, and ne 
feave been asked to pri duce an in>iance in w hich s >ver' igoty has submitted 
itself to any judicial tribunal Thosi? who tormt-d the constitution, in their 
recommendatory letter signed by Washington on the 17th of September, 
1787, inform us that " it is obviously impracticable in the federal govern- 
ment of these States to secure all the rights of INDEFC.NDLNT SO- 
VEREIGNTY to each, and yet provide for the interest and satety ot all."' 
The gentleman|from TenDessee, in ord^r to explain and construe the con- 
stitution, referred to the brief euumeration, contained in this letter, t/f the 
specific objects which made V necessary to est iblish this government. I 
refer to the same authority to ovei throw the doctrine which regards all the 
rights of independent sovereignty in each of the States, and to prove that 
some of those rights were, in the view of the c;»nventioD, ceded to provide 
for the general welfare. States are not self-existent : they are created by 
the people for their benefit. Those who have conferred state power, can 
take it away ; and fwr ilieir own good they have tran;ferred a portion of 
this mysterious principle of sovereignty, which troubl'^s gentlemen so much^ 
to another place. They have transferred a portion of the Judicial power 
to the Supreme Court, which acts as an impartial umi^ire, and not 43 an ad- 
versary party deciding his own cause, as is erroneous-ly supposed by si»me 
reasoners here. The gentleman from Tennessee says (he Federal Judici- 
ary is, when a question of State rights is before it, a portion or pan of one 
of the parlies, created by the Legislative and Executive branches of the 
general government, responsible to thai government alone, and liable to the 
imposition of destructive burdens by that parly. Even if all this were 
correct, it would be a sufficient answer to it, when discussing this question, 
10 reply that the Stales had agreed that the arbiter should be thus created 
and thus responsible, having signed the arbitiation bond deliberatrly and 
wiih a full knowledge of the consequences. But when we look into the in- 
strument we find that the States, by their representatives in the Senate, must 
first consent to the a|)pointmcnt of the arbiter, or be is not lawfully chosen. 
They can challenge for cause, ai^d they can challenge peremptorily. By 
retusing to coiisent to appointments, they migiji in time vacate every seat 
on the whole tribunal. Dy the Legislative power of their immediate re- 
presentatives in the Senate, responsible lo the Slates as tiieir only masters, 
ihey can always jirevcnt the imposition of oppressive burdens on iheir com- 
man arbiters. 'I'hey alone can try these arbiti-rs on impeachment for mis- 



behaviour, aud wiihoui impeachmeni those arbilcrs caaaot be removea 
iVoni office. The Senator fiom Kentucky objects to the Feder;il Ju- 
diciary, that a majority in Congress may by law increase the number ol" 
judges, and thus oppress the minority when they please. It has been said, 
too, that larg*' States, with a great representntion in Congress, such as 
New York and Fennsylv.mia, combining wiih oth-^rs, nny byah^ir supfrior 
vote so far increase th^ number on the bench as to oppress and destroy the 
sovereignty of the lesser States. If the objertion has any weight, it is one 
which could be made to our whole system of rppublicao government. 
We are ruled by majorities; and if the majority of this nation should be- 
come radically corrupt, I admit that the government will soon fall. Cut 
I liave sufficient reliance on the virtue and good sense of the people, 
whether living in large or small States, to believe that no attempt will ever 
be deliberately made by a majority in either, to destroy the independence 
and legitimate powers of the other. And I feel no apprehensions on this 
subject, for other reasons. Let us inquire into the mode of operating. Sup- 
posing now (to make out the gt^nlleraan's case) that the large States wicked-' 
]y conspire to ruin the small ones. New York, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsyl- 
vania, V^irginia and North Carolina, being (as would be so probable !) unit- 
ed for this end, carry a bill through the other House to double the number 
of judges. Suppose, too, that they had by their votes elected a President 
who would second their views. When the bill comes before the Senate, 
if the small States understand your object, they, having an equal 
representation here, secured by the only provision in the constitution 
which numbers can never change, vote you down at once; and your 
combination (as other combinations may be) is consigned to 

" that saniP anci> ni vHult, 

Where all the kindred of the Capulets lie." 

But suppose the Senators representing the small Stales here, not suspecting 
mischief, but relying on your integrity, suffer the bill to pass. Your President 
being in the plot, as we will for the sake of argument suppose, it be- 
comes a law. What then ? The bench is not yet filled. The " modus 
operandi" requires that he should nominate, and we should consent to the 
appointment of the men who are to adjudge away our independence. VVe 
might be slow to suspect our old fi lends of dishonest purposes, but we can 
'earn some things if you give us lime. When you bring out your nomioa- 
tions, we cannot fail to understand your plan. You are caught at once, 
jlnBrante delicto, and we check you in the Senate, by rejecting all nomi- 
oatiuns which do not please us. VVe have two chances to put an effectual 
veto on your plot, and our veto is a very different affair from your State 
veto on an act of Congress. However thankful, therefore, we may be for 
the kindly apprehensions expressed for our welfare, we say that we are not 
yet alarmed. We cannot see, with the honorabl^' gentleman from Teones- 
^Pe^that the States have been guilty of either folly or weakness in creating 



14 

such a tribunal as we conceive the Supreme Court oi the United States to 
be — nor do we think with him, that by the easiest operatio-is imaginable 
this creature is so compt'tent to the destruction of it<; creators. 

But whatever may have been, in the opinion of honorable gentlemen, the 
folly of the people of these States in creating such a tribunal, or however 
incompetent it may appear to decide these matters, the questionstill recurs — 
Is there any other lorum established with co-extensive, or with appellate 
powers? If so, what is it ? There ought not to be a wrong without a 
remedy, and the interest and safety of all require the existence of some arbi- 
ter to grant a remedy. We are warned, however, that if by the Constitu- 
tion there be not some express grant of power for this purpose, the States 
and the people still jeserve it. On the other hand, if the grant to the Fe- 
deral Judiciary be express, the States have not reserved it, andean create 
no other without forming a new Constitution or violating this. Sir, I lis- 
tened with deep interest to the developement of what I thought was an- 
nounced as a new discovery on this subject. I will consider that adverted 
'to, and recommended, by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Grundy. ! 
After conceding to the Federal Judiciary the powers of a common umpire, 
to decide on th<' constitutionality of all Congressional enactments made in 
pursuance of the Constitution, he informed us that there was another tri- 
bunal to which a State might resort when oppressed by what she considered 
to be a plain, palpable, and dangerous violation of the Constitution, with- 
out throwing herself out of the L^nion. []e admitted that the Legislature of 
the State was not this tribunal. Toat might be misled. He beats the giound 
then which was occupied by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. 
Hayne,) but himself takes a new position, not less dangerous. For he in- 
formed us that a State Convention might be called, and that might nullify the 
oppressive law — after which, he thought Congress must acquiesce by aban- 
doning the power. The amount of this is, that one State is to govern all 
the rest whenever she may choose to declare, by Convention, that a law is 
unconstitutional, Theendof this, we ray, is war — civil war. We admit that 
a Slate Convent ion may pronounce any law unconstitutional, as Virginia did 
in '98. But the mere declaration comes to nothing, unless it can be enforced. 
You may declare a law unconstitutional, and so can 1. But what of that r 
It amounts only to this — we have full freedom of speech in this country, may 
advocate what opinions we please, and peaceably endeavor to impress them 
upon others. But the gentleman says this doctrine does not lead to war. 
If Congress will not submit to the State, he thinks there is still a complete 
political salvo in another tribunal, and that is a Cnnvention of the States 
to be called under the provisions of the Constitution. The State then must 
exert iietsulf until Congress, two thirds deeming it necessary under the fifth 
article, shall propose amendments to the Constitution ; or, on the application 
«f ihe Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shaW call n Cnnvpn- 



\\iia lor proposing ainendments, whicli, when ralilied by the Legislatures of 
ihreo-fourilis of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths of 
ibem, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution, 
So far this does not contravene the doctrine which we advocate, and which 
the Senator from New ilair;pshire, if I rightly understood him, after much 
preface, and with some " slips of prolixity," finally set;led down upon as a 
part of the true orthodox creed. The right to amend the Constitution has 
never been denied. This was a part of the pi.liiical |)latform upon which 
my bont)rable friend from Missouri, (Mr. Barton,) invited you to come 
and stand with us. If the Convention of the States should assemble and 
decide by a majority of three fourths against the Slate, the gentleman from 
Tennessee says the State must submit. But if they decide otherwise, or 
do not decide at all, Congress must submit to the State. Without assenting 
to this last concJusion, which appears to be arbitrarily assumed, 1 will only 
.inquire, if this be so, how is this tribunal to save us from civil war ? The 
answer is, only by so amending the Constitution as to warp it to suit the 
declarations of the State Convention. This is an excellent remedy for tho 
complaint of the Slate, but rather difficult to procure. If this is the sover* 
eiga panacea which the honorabi»f Seoaior from I'ennessee has discovered 
for healing the diseases of the South — Sir, I fancy she will agree with me 
in commending her physician fur his ingenuity in finding out the ingredients 
of the bolus, but she will still think ihey are too hard to be obtained to 
render the prescription valuable to her. With less experience, I would 
recommend to a State groaning under the operation of a law which she 
deems unconstitutional, to apply firsl to the Federal Judiciary, where she 
will generally obtain relief, if her complaint be not hypochondria or imag- 
inary ill. If she fail there, let her pour her complaints into the ears of her 
sisters, and use all constilulional means to procure a rzpealoi the obnoxious 
law. A bare majority of Congress will be sulhcient to give her relief in 
this way. Do you object that Congress will probably persevere in their 
course, and refuse to repeal the law they have enacted ? It may be so — 
and if so, their constituents, beiiig a majority of the people, must concur with 
them, that '.lie law is not only ccnsiituiional but s;iluiary, or they would, by 
the exercise of the elective franchise, remove such unworthy agents of their 
sovereign will, ifiheydo concur with their representatives, and uphold 
them in their refusal to repeal the law, no matter how often by any other 
power than the Federal Judiciary declared to be unconstitutional, in my 
bumble judgment you will hardly persuade three-fourths of thf^mto assem- 
ble for the purpose of altering their Constitution, and depriving their own 
agents of the power of acting on the subject. 

It comes at last then to this — that we have no other direct resource, in 
ii>e cases we have been cousidering, to save us from the horrors of anarch v., 
than the Supreme Court of the United States. That tribanil lu*" dpclH-'' 



d buniired such cases, and many under the most menacing circuot&laDces 
Several States have occasionally made great opposition to it- Indeed ir 
would seem that in their turn most of the Sisters of this great family have 
fretted for a time, sometimes threatening to brenk the connection and form 
others — but in the end nearly all have been reitored, by the dignified ant' 
impartial conduct of our common umpire, to perfect good humour. Should 
ihat umpire ever lose iis hi^h character for justice and impartiality, we 
have a correctivo in llie form of our government ; but if it is to be had 
only by a calm and temperate appeal to the ju'^graent and feelings of the 
whole American people, it can never be obtained by such addresses and 
resolutions as those of Colleton or Abbeville. Reason receives not in place 
of argument violent denunciatiotis or furious appeals to party and passion. 
During a period of four or five years past, the complaints of the Soutli 
have for this reason met with a cold reception in almost every other section 
of the Union. They have been loud and deep — but they have been evi- 
dently regarded as the transient effusions of party feeling, coming, as they 
loo often did, couched in language of bitter vituperation, with the now stale 
and despicable rharg s of " coalition, bargain and corruption," that vile and 
plutrescent stuff which hasal length, as the Si'nator from Massachusetts truly 
slated, sloughed off and gone down into the kennel forever. The course pur- 
sued WHS exactly that which was best calculatpd to mrtke the whole alleged 
grievances, if real, irremediable. Those who loved and admired the charac- 
ter of the Statesman nf the West, indignant at the calumnies with which he, as 
ihey saw, was so unjustly assailed, often regarded the complaints which 
came with them as niere secondary considerations, brought in to aid a per- 
sonal attack. On the other hand, n>any of those who affected to accredit 
those calumnies for political f ffect, in their hearts never sincerely believed 
any part of the story of southern sufferings, thinkinir perhaps that they knew 
best what weight was to be attached to the political falsehoods which com- 
monly accompanied them. However different their objects, they were re- 
ally on the same chas", but to the southern huntsman the game taken has 
been of no benefit. From a recent demonstration, we perceive tho South- 
ern complaint is uow not even deemed worthy of a hearing. Sir, when I 
witnessed the manly and candid manner in which the Honorable Senator 
from South Carolina on my right (Mr. S.-^iixn) spoke of the grievances of 
his constituents, when I saw him evidently soaring above mere party feel- 
ing, menacing none, der.ouncing none, and touching with all the delicacy 
which characterizes iiim the subjects in diiierence between us, the reflectioo 
forced itself irresistibly on my mind — how different might have been the re 
ccpilon of tlicio complaints, had they always come thus recommended. 
Soutli Carolina, though erring in a controversy vtiili her sisters, would by al! 
have been believed to have born honestly wrong; ami if under such 
cincun)stances she should ever threw herself out of the pale of th" 



I? 

TJnion Id consequence of such a misconception of ihe constitution as we 
have endenvouri'd to prevent, 1 would ralhj'r see my own cofl- 
slituents slii()ped of tlie property acquired under the protection fur- 
nished by tiie government to llieir honest industry, than compclleci by 
any vote of mine here to drive ilie ste^■l with whicli we should arm our cil* 
izens into the bosoms of that gallunt pt'ople. And 1 will now say, without 
meaning to express any lurther opinion on this delicate subject, that, for my- 
self, whenever pounds, shillings and fience alone shall be arrayed against 
iht^ infinite blessings of the Union, I s. .ill unhesitatingly pref-^r the latter — 
for tiie siin()le reason, that I can tjever learn how to '' calculate its value.'' 
The honorable member from New Hampshire, in the progress of his very 
ingenious remarks, discussed, in connection with the constitutional power of 
ihe Judiciary, the whole doctrine of internal improvement, as well as the 
tarilT. He denounced both as aggressions of the Federal government on 
the rights of the States, as measures evincive of and flowing from a dispo- 
sition on the part of some, to claim for that government unlimited powers; 
and endeavoured to nuke it appear that these acts for internal improve- 
ment were and ever had been Federal heresies, while the oppi'site and re- 
strictive tenets, limiting us to the strict exercise of certain enumerated and 
specific powers, had always distinguished you.' genuine democrat and only 
true republican. The h norable member iniormed us that by the preva- 
lence of his strict construction of the constitution over the J.ilitudinariaQ 
doctrines, the great political revolution of 1800 was eflect'd, and that 
his mode of construction bad ever since remained " the watch- word of de- 
mocracy" and the strongest " test of political orthodoxy." He showed 
us by these means how " the matchless spirit of the West,'' the gr^-at advo- 
cate of the principles so denounced, had always been a federalist, while on 
the other hand he barely intimated that a matchless spirit in the Si uth had 
perhaps been misrepresented on the same subject. The intimation, that 
iho views of one statesman had been misunderstood, was accompanied by 
Ihe admission that there might be dillerences, and possibly honest difi'cr- 
ences, on the same subject, in the same party, Tniswas all well — and my 
only reason for adverting to it, is to express my regret that so charitable a 
sa^tfo was not extended beyond the paity line. But we w< re afterwards 
told by the honourable member, that the resemblance between the political 
character of the opposition and administration parties, in 1798, 1812, 
and 182S, confers upon him, and his political friends, " a title to old fashion- 
ed democracy, as the same democratic States, with one or two exceptions 
only, are found, (he sa>s,j at each era, side by side, in fnvour of JeH'erson, 
Madison, and the hero of Orleans. On one side Virginia, and Pennsyl- 
vania, Carolina and Geoigia, Tennessee and Kentucky. On the other 
Delaware and Massachussett^, Connecticut, and divided Maryland." I 
shall hereafter take leave to present to the view of the honourable meiobev 
3 



t9 

some coincrdencps much more striking than that which here ypppars fo have 
caught his fancy. Kt'pping in view now (he position assumed by liim,in rf'eard 
to the tederahsm of the Wpstern statesman, and other advocates of internal 
improvement, 1 would enquire into the title to "old fashioned democracy'^ 
of Georgia, Carolina, and other Southern States, here designated by him, 
on the 14ih of March 1818, when twenty one of their representatives in 
the otler House carried the resolution which fully established this '' fede- 
ral" heresy — declaring '' that Co'^'^rcss has power, under the constitution, 
to appropriate inoney for the constiuction of post roads, military and oth- 
er roads, and for the improvement of water-courses." Four of the seven 
representatives from South Carolina, Mr. Lowndes, Mr. Simkins, Mr. 
Middleton, and Mr. Erwin, voted for this resolution, the two first named 
gentlemen advocating, in the debate to which it gave rise, the power oi 
Congress to construct Roads and Canals. VVIien the resolution was 
adopted, Mr. Lowndes declared that tlie decision then made had settled the 
whole question. Two thirds of the Georgia delegation, Mr. Abbott, Mr. 
J.Crawford, Mr. Terrill, and Mr. Forsyth now an honourable Senator 
from that State, supported the same resolution. Did Carolina and Georgia 
then foifeit their " title to old fashioned democracy?" Shall we not try 
them too, as well as Delaware and Massachusetts, by the " strongest test of 
political orthodoxy." If Delaware is here to be put on trial, she will stand 
his test admirably. Though generally Federal until 1826, when the 
new paities were formed, she was almost uniformly represented in 
this Senate, up to that period, by Federal gentlemen holding on 
this subject the very tenets of the honourable member himself, al- 
ways confining the powers of the government to the specitic and 
enumerated objects ; and opposed alike to these acts for internal improve- 
ment and laritl'iaws. Id 1827 and 1828, she was represented here by 
two able Statesmen of the opposite and latitudinarian creed, both of whom 
had been federalists ; but at that time, Sir, they were d^ed in the wool by 
the Jackson process, ami, of course, were genuine republicans, as the 
honourable member will admit. They neither changed or concealed their 
opinions. Were they not "orthodox?" One of them, standing couspicu« 
ous for his talents in the ranks of the orthodox party, now, by their ap- 
pointment, represents us at the proudest court in Europe. It cannot be ne- 
cesiisary to follow out the inquiry further, to try the truth of his test by a 
rcftrence »i> niusty records and by gone events. If the honourable mem- 
ber will pursue it, he will soon find bimself, by the aid of such a test, in- 
volved in the mazes of a labyrinth, from which he could not escape iu 
safety, oven with the thread «)f an Ariadne to guide him. Sir, the whole 
ot this part of tbe gentleman's ingenious argument is adniirably calculated, 
ad caplamlum, ,\i it n)akes all our Canals, liail Roads, and Turn[)ikes,. 
which huve bten made by ibe a»sistan«o of Congress, the works of tha^ 



19 

anatliematized " peace party in war/' which, as we have been told here, 
has btir-n thus strugfjling, since the earliest period ot uur history, to confer 
upun our rulers absolute power ; and I will now dismiss it, that it may per- 
form the duties of its mission, with this single remark, that you may perceive, 
peeping through its foregone conclusions, how the bent of th** gontlemm's 
mind, in condemning Southern votes, is evidently at this time inclining with 
a breeze to the North Norlh-East— though I still suppose that, " when the 
wind is southerly, he will know a hawk from a handsaw." 

So far as the State which I have the lionor in part to represent here, 
can furnish evidence to illustrate the title of the honorable member, and his 
political associates, to " old fashioned democracy," by the fact that a parly 
odious to them has always prevailed there, he is welcome to the evidence 
for his own uses. It will never redound to her discredit. It can never be 
a cause of exultation to any man who knows the history of his own country, 
and values his own reputation, to find her always arrayed against him. 
And as the honorable member has called my attention to the subject, I will 
remind him what kind of a '- peace party in war" we have always had in 
Delaware. We have ever had such a party there as " bewares of er)trance 
to a quarrel," but, being once engaged in it, puts forth all its energies of 
body and soul in the controversy, and for the love of peace fairly fights 
cut of it. We had a party of this kind at the bloody era of the Americaa 
revolution, contending against the usurpations of iho British Crown — a 
party which supplied more warriors in the cause of Americiin liberty, ia 
proportion to our limited means and population, than were furnished by 
any other State in the whole coni'ederation. The bones of many of that 
old party were buried on Long Island, and at White Plains, at Princeton, 
at Brandywine, at Germantown, at Camden, at Guilford, at Eutaw, and at 
Yorktown; and your pension rolls now show but fnurteeii of them live and 
dependent on your bounty. Many of that party were at F'ort Mifflin too ; 
and the gentleman from Maryland, (General Smith,) the father of the Am- 
erican Senate, (himself one of the most distinguished patriots of the revolu- 
tion,) who commanded there, when referring in debate a few days since to 
the conduct of one of them, (Captain Hazzard,) bore lestimony ti) that 
kind of peace-loving disposition in war which we cherish, when, almost 
overpowered by the emotion caused by a recurrence to the sad history of the 
sufferings of his gallant comrades, he described our old peace party troops 
as soldiers than whom better or braver had never existed. I am told that 
we had Federalists who opposed the declaration of the last war ; but those 
very Federalists, like their brethren of the op(K)site party, supported the 
cause of their country through the whole w»ar with unbending firmness and 
devoted patriotism. We have national republi :ans, I am now told; but as 
they are made up of the same kind of materials which composed the peace 
parlies I have been describing, I shall be pardoned if I defer to other 



20 

judgment than that of the gentleman from N^w Hampsliir-', and say that I 
am prcud to represent them here, even though, by so doing, I am placf-d in 
oppc'siiiori to an administration which claims to be exclusiv»-ly dfniocratic, 
and vet a|)p"inis more F^deralisis to office than all its predecessors liHve 
dune since the revoluti> n of 1801 — always, nevertheless, keeping steadily in 
view this indispensable qnalifiralion, that every Federalist so appointed 
ninst be of the Jackson stamp. I shall ever feel attachment for th >t party 
which seeks in peace to prepare for war, by extending the beneficent action 
of this government to increase the means of our deft^nce, makes roads and 
canals to transport our munitions in time of need, foriifiesonr coast, improves 
our harbours, protects our cnmmerce, and has already built up a navy 
which is the glory of our couniry and the admiration of ilie world. 

Sir, I must be ptirdoned for dwelling at length in reply to other remarks 
of the honorable member fr"m New Hampshire, whose opinions and rea- 
sonin? are regarded, by some of his political friends here, as laying dovvn 
the law and fixing the standard of political orthodoxy. Wnen he had 
closed his remarks, the Senator from Missouri near him (Mr. Benton) 
ari'se in his place, and pronounced the honorable gen leman to be his Peter, 
the rock on which he would build the great democratic Church, 

[Mr. Cknton liaving riseu in explain, Mr. Clayton gave way for the 
purpose. 

JMr. Centon. — I did not say "this is my Peter. I said — yes, this is Peter, 
and this Peter is the rock on which the Church of New England demo- 
cracy shall be built. This is w hat I said aloud, and what the Senate heaid. 
AVhat I said in a lower tone, and not intended for the Senate, was this, 
" and the gates oJ lieil shall not prevail against him.''] 

Mr. Clayton resumed. Sir, I accept his modification, and wish to pre- 
sent fairly, not only all the words, wheiJier spoken on a high or a low key, 
but the action which was so admirably adapted to them. The gentleman 
from Missouri then, in the face of the Senate, extended his right arn> over 
the head of the gentleman from New Hampshire, wiih all the niajosiy of a 
Cardinal, or a full r. bed Bishop, about to prenounc* a benedittiuD on a new 
monaich, oi to injjtall a new incumbent of the papal see, and, as he now 
says, did not meiely declare him to be his Peter, but ann> unced him to the 
world as the great Ponlifl' ol New England democracy; and, of course, I 
suppose, (as t/iat, by his former admissions, is as good as ani/,) of all other 
democracy unUir the whole Heavens. Sir, I had the right to suppose that 
lie who thus inducted him to office had full powers, or he would not have 
performed the ciremoiiy. (Jive me leave to say, that when 1 heard the 
jictt r<ihldl lay down liis law in conformity with my old-fashioned nolions 
of the powers of tiie Judiciary, abjuring, as a political heresy, alt the n^w 
" Carolina doctrii.c," though seemingly endorsed by the Senator from Mis- 
hout'i himself, 1 thot'jzht that I should stand at least one of the new " tests 



21 

of political ortliodox}'," 'and I sincerely hoped that, on ibis subject, notb' 
ing might prevail agninst liim. \\ ht-o he issued ibis, his first bull, 1 felt 
disposed to register all bis rescripts, and I ceriainly b;»ve preached the very 
doctrine which it inculcated. But when I heard the American System 
denounced as a mere federal measure ; when I h^ard, too, from the san»e 
source, \h;\i a good oflicer ought to be removed belore the regubir expira- 
tion of bis teru), lor party motives, or personal aggrandizement, and the 
whole prescriptive system of the new administration thus justified and 
exlolhd,— then. Sir, I confess (meanipg nothing irreverent by my allusions) 
that 1 became a DESSENTEU AND A IT;OTESTANT, and although 
I expect indulgence for such transgressions, I siroi:gly suspect that I shall 
carry my abominable heresies to the grave. 

The Se^iatnr IVom Missouri, (Mr. Uarton,) having, in the range of this 
dtbatf-, inviied the concurrence of others in certain fundamental principles 
and important objects, enumerated among the number the preservation of 
the freedom and purity ot elections, unawed by official punishments, and 
uncorrupted by ofl'icial rewards, in opposition to removals from office for 
the exercise ot the great elective (rancliise, or to make room for the reward 
of paitisans in our Presidectial Elections, by the bestowal of [)ublic em- 
plt.ymtnts. lie submitted that the jios^er of removal from office by tho 
President was a high legal trust, to be exercised for the public benefit, in 
sound discretion, for cause relating to the official conduct or fiiness of the 
incumbent; that the Senate of the United States had restraining powers in 
the matter of displacing, as well as of appointing Federal oflicers ; and that, 
by the Constitution, the Executive power could neVer be arbitrarily exer- 
cised. He advocated " the freedom of inquiry into the exercise of Execu- 
tive discretion and official trust, in opposition to Executive irresponsibility 
and unseurcliableness, and to the suppression of fiee inquiry into our politi- 
cal aflairs." The Senator from Maine (Mr. Holmes) merely adverted to 
the geneial proscription in Nt;w England. In reply to these gentlemen, tho 
SeniUor from New Hampshire says he will not accept the invitation of the 
Senator from Missouri, (Mr. Uarton,) Id stand on his new political plat- 
form, composevf, as he considers it, of articles of opposition to the present 
administration — c'efends the whole course of that administration as *' demo- 
cratic and constitution?*!," and informs us that, in the principle of removal 
from office, for even political motives, their policy only follows up the doc- 
trines of the great revolution in 1800. He speaks of these removals as 
mere rotation in office, first made by the people themselves in the highest 
office in the land, the Chief Executive of the Union, for political cause, 
then inquires, triumphantly, if the same cause should not aflect the active 
■deputies and sulioniinates, as well as the principal. " Whatever disop- 
poiiilmen's and suffering by removal, (sa\s he,) si^me individuals may sus- 
tain ; i/c( ihet/ knew the If gal tenure of their njiccs.'' He, therefore, thinks 



ihe agents of the people cannol fear the crj of cruelty or persecution, be- 
cause the power of removalj as now exercised, ooly " changes ow good 
man," (that is, for political opinions,) "for another good man," and, there- 
fore, does no injury to the public. He then proceeds ti say these agents 
need not dread the discussion of the constilutionaUty of their exercise of 
this power, thus plainly avowed by him to have been levelled at the 
right of opinion. Sir, the honornble Senator from Tennessee, (^iNlr. 
Gbundy,) if I rightly understood him, avowed the same opinions ; fur he 
denied the rieht of the Senate to inqwite into the causes of removal, and 
insisted that the present administration had not gone beyond his principles 
on this subject. He contended that the Senate would transcend their con- 
stitutional power, and thus violate the instrument which it is their interest 
to preserve, by examining into and judging of the proprit^ty of reniuvals 
from office, or by controlling the Executive in the discharge (if ihis branch of 
his authority. He entered into a full discussion ol the rights of the President 
with great ingenuity, and manfully challenged us " to come out bildly, and 
discuss this subject with his friends freely and frankly." The honorable gen- 
tleman is a formidable antagonist. He wields a long knife with a strong arm, 
in defence of his friends ; but when he throws down his gauntlet to what is 
here called the opposition, and defies them to a contest icith these princi- 
ples of this Admiimtration, he will be met freely, frankly, and boldly too. 
Mr. Fkesjdent; Another year has rolled away. Our ides of March are 
come. This day, which is the anniversary of the Chief Magistrate's Inau- 
guration, brings with it some strange reminiscences of the past, and some still 
stranger anticipations of the future. On the last 4th of March, and at abou^ 
this very hour of the day, the American Senate followed the American 
President in the progress of his stately triumph to that scene where, in the 
presence of assembled thousands of his countrymen, he proclaimed to the 
world the principles upon which he intended to administer the government. 
Independently of the fact, that the whole subject has been thrust into this 
debate, as I have stated, there seems to be some propriety in devoting a 
portion of the passing hour to the consideration of the extent and inlluence 
of executive authority. These on this day would be proper subjects of 
relleciion for the Chief Magistrate hin:self ; and as we are his constitutional 
advisers, exercising, Ih one sense, a portion of the executive power, we 
may learn our own duty bettor by the temperate examination of his, I con- 
cur with the grntleujan that in discussing this, or any other subject, involv- 
ing a questivtn of constitutional law, passion and feeling are to be regarded 
as poor auxiliaries. We should go for nobler game than niere paiiy 
interests. Principles are to be first settled here ; but then the application 
of them must be learlessly made. The fust inquiry ought to be, what are 
the true piinciplcs ; — not what is ilie interest ol ans f)arty. It will be found 
thai my view of those priaciples dillers, as much, in some respects, from 



jliose of some to whose judcnipnt I iisuaHy defer, as it does, in others, from 
those of some who profess to hr politically arrayed against me. 

The power ot removal is no where exiireasly conft-rred hy the Constitu- 
tion, except in the section which provides that all civil officers of the United 
States shall he removed from office on impeachment for, or on conviction 
of, treason, bribery, or other high ciimes and misdemeanors. A Judge, 
the tenure of whose office is dum bene se gesserit, is removeable only by 
this means. But where good behaviour is not the tenure of office, the 
power of removal is properly and generally incident to, and a consequence 
of, the power of appointment. The power to destroy is ordinarily implied 
from the power to create. It is a common axiom of our jurisprudence, that 
the authority to dissolve a thing must be as high as that which formed if. 
The Legislature which has the express power to pass a law for raising 
revenue, for example, has the necessary power to repeal it. The Govern- 
ors of many of the States enjoy, by express provisions in iheir respective 
constitutions, the power of appointment to office, and yet exercise by con- 
struction, and by implication only, the power of removal from it, their State 
Constitutions being silent nn that subject. The Post Master General, who, 
harmonizing with this administration, has removed, within the last year, 
his thousand deputies, agents, and clerks, though vested by law with the 
express right of appointing them, can point you to no statute conferring 
upon him the right to remove one of them. The numerous clerks and 
agents appointed under express legal provisions, by other Heads of Depart- 
ments here, are removeable only by the same construction. The law has 
conferred upon the Supreme Court the power of appointing its Clerk, and, 
although considered removeable by it, yet no law has thus limited the 
tenure of his office in express terms. But then this authority, thus derived 
from implication and construction, if kept within the spirit of the Constitu- 
tion and the laws, instead of being used arbitrarily or tyrannically, caa 
be exercised only for the public welfare. 

In two classes of cases the power of appointment is exercised by the 
President alone : — first, where Congress have, by law, vested in hin> the 
appointment of such inferior officers as they thought proper ; and, secondly, 
where he is empowered to make appointments by virtue of the last clause in 
the second section of the second article. There are some peculiar consi- 
derations growing out of the maimer in which the power of removal in tho 
first of these classes has been exercised, which it is unnecessary to enter 
into now, as they are not immediately connected with the executive rights 
of the Senate. Appointments of the second class are temporary only by 
the express provisions of the clause which authorizes them. " The Pre- 
sident shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may liR[)pen during the 
recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end 
of their next session^" With tlu'se exceptions, tho second section rcferced 



2i 

fo expressly coDfers the power of appointment upon tho President and 
Senate, by I'nR words " lie s'jall nontiuate, aud, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, shall appoint." 

Although the Consiiiution has thus recognised t!ie Senate as an essen- 
tial componrut part of the appointing authority, yet the power of removal 
has been uniformly exercised by the President alone since the Conslitnlion 
was established. This then has been a deviation from the general priaci- 
ple, that the right to remove can be exercised only where the right to 
appoint exists. But, I do not concur with the bonorable gentlemen 
who have viewed lliis' power as unlimited by the spirit of the Con- 
stitution, and having arrived at the conclusion that aic volo is the legal 
tenure of olYice, would leavo it to become the sport of a spirit not less arbi- 
trary and tyrannical than that of absoltite despotism, tvery administra- 
tion preceding this has professed to exercise this power within cerlairt 
established constitutional linjitaiions, regarding removals as expedients to be 
resorted to by the President only for the purpose of secuiiog a faithful 
execution of the laws, or when really necessary for the general welfare. 
And if a single instance can be shown in which any President bef(H"e this 
has ever prostituted this auihority to party uses, or Ibr personal aggrandize- 
ment, it will be found that he has, at least in terms, assumed the virtue of 
administering the government on difl'erent principles, and denied that he 
intended to invade the riL'ht of opinion, or pervert his power from its legiti- 
mate object. The history as well of the precedent up.m which the Sena- 
tor from Tennessee so ntMich relies, as of others lo which he has not advert- 
ed, shows that this constructive power would h-tre never been acknow- 
ledged if it had not beeu supposed to have btt.-n strictly limited aqd dis- 
tinctly defined. 

When tlje bill "for establishing an Executive Department, to be called 
the Department of Foreign AlV^irs," was under the consideration of the 
House of Representatives, during the first session of Congress after the 
adoption of the Constitution, the debate to which the gentleman from Ten- 
nessee has referred, arose upon one of its provisions granting to the Presi- 
dent the right of removing the Secretary to whom our foieign relations were 
to be principally entrusted. That provision was then so m.)dified as not to- 
carry with it the appearance of a grant of something not bc-fore given, bui to 
recognise a constitutional power of removal already subsisting in the Presi- 
dent. The power was strongly denied by .Mr. Gerry and Mr. Roger Sher- 
man, and maintained by tMr. .Madison and Mr Baldwin. These genilemen 
had all been members of ine Convention that made the Constitution, and 
yet were thus equally divided in opinion on the corrstroclioo of the very 
jnslrunient which they had, so recentfy before that, assisted in forming. The 
point then was regarded as extremely doubtfiil. There were others, who 
had not been members of the Convention, who engaged on dilTereul side? 



25 

with equal zeal in the contest, until at length a construction Implying tlic 
existence of the power was established, so far as a tribunal which had 
no jurisdiction over the subject could do it, by a vote ot' thirty four to 
twenty. It has often been observed, and I ap[)rehend it is inqupstionaljly 
true, that thecharacter of VVashinf;ton,th(?n President of the United Slates, 
liad great inlluence in producing this decision. Add to this, too, that the 
question arose in the very strongest case which could have been presented 
for the advocates of the Executive — the case of a Secretary, between whom 
and the President it was absolutfly necessary that the most coufidtjutial 
relations shnuld subsist. These supporters of Executive authority were 
theu, as men will ever be, intliieuced in some degree by the circumstances 
immeiii.itely around them. Tiie statesmen of the day literally vied with 
each other in expressions of their high confidence in the man who then 
filled the Chair of State, beloved by all, and distrusted by none ; and it is 
but too evident from the arguments advanced on this occasion, that they 
were beguiled by the imagination that none but beings of such exalted 
virtue and spotless purity would ever be elected to succeed him. They 
reasoned from an illusion to wiiicii human nature- is at all times liable. Un- 
der such circumstances, a principle was decided, which forms a distinct ex- 
ception to an established general rule ; and it cannot escape observHtion 
that under other auspices a veiy different result would probibly have been 
produced by the deliberations of 17S9. The discussion to sustain this power 
mainly rested on these brief positions — that ih^ Constitution had conferred 
upon the President the Executive power — that the general concession 
of Ex*-cutive authority embraced removals, as well as appointments — 
that the power granted to the Senate, being an exception to this ge-neral 
provisiDU, ought therefore to be construed strictly, and could not be ex- 
tended beyond the express right (with its necessary incidents) of ne^a- 
living appointments — and, above all, that the President, being bound to 
" take care that the laws be faithfully executed," must therefore re- 
move whenever the public interest imperiously requires it. The last position, 
aided by all the extraneous considerations referred to, was successful. Eve- 
ry reasoner dwelt upon it as the keystone of the argument. It was not 
then contended by the fathers of the republic, that the general grant of 
Executive power was to be construed alone by the strict specifications of it, 
subsequently entered in the same instrument. True, ogr modern reason- 
ers revolt at the thought of extending the powers of Congress beyond the 
specific enumeration of them, by a general grant of " all leg.slative 
power;" and although ihe .honourable gentleman from Mew Hampshire 
has informed us that the friends of this administration, claiming tiie au- 
thority to remove in its utmost latitude, need not dread the discussion of 
their right to do so, yet he has, in this very debate, stoutly denied a con- 
struction, to the general delegation of power to Congress in the Constitution 
4 



26 

""lo provide for the gfneral welfare," similar to the one placed In 1789 
upon the general delegatiou of Executive power " to take care that the 
laws shall be faithfully executed." Without this latitudinarian interpre- 
tation, the power of removal would hare remained forever, on the gene- 
ral principle, \a the President and Senate. But it was not urged io 1789, 
by any m-ju, that 'his constructive power was uiiliniiied and absolute ; ca 
the contrary, guagiug it by the strict standard of the rule which defin- 
ed while It couferred it, they declared that it was given to the Presi- 
dent only f )r the purpose of " securing a faitkful erecution nf the laics,'" 
as an incident to his great prerogative to preside over his country for 
his country's good. They pointed out the very cases for its proper ex- 
ercise : Thry said it was necessary to remove a traitor from office, " to 
secure a faithful execution of the laws:" They urged that an officer 
who should become insane, corrupt, disabled, or in any manner or by 
any means unfaithful or disqualilied to serve the public to the public 
advantage, ought to be, and was of right removable, in order " to secure 
a faithful execution of the laws ;" and having thus measured and mark- 
ed down the length, the breadth, and the depth of the whole principle 
recognised by them, they doubtless little expected that any opinion 
given, or precedent set by them, would ever be adduced to sanction the 
exeicise of uncontrolled and despotic power. The honourable gentle- 
man from Tenuessee, wlio lias filled the office of a Judge with great cred- 
it to himself, says that he loves precedents ; and having informed us that 
"Mr. Madison understood the Constitution and structure of the govern- 
ment as well as any man that ever lived," holds up the Congressional 
Register of that day, points to the opinion of that able statesnjan there 
given, and triumphantly announces that there we may see his doctrine*, 
and there his cunstitutiunut luwi/er. Sir, we may venture here, I think, 
to meet the gentleman on his own grounds. I say, too, that, like others 
from the schools uf forensic disputation, 1 love precedents; and that Mr. 
Madison on this subject is also mi/ constitutional lawyer. But then, when 
1 like the opinion of a constitutional lawyer so well, I take the whole, and 
not merely a part of it. 1 do not gr.ituiiously reject one half of it, while 
I rely so much ujjon the other. I read from the same volume Mr. Ma- 
dison's words, uttered on thrtt same occasion, that " the dismission of a 
meritorious officer was an abuse of power ABOVE HIS COiNCEPTION, 
and would merit impeachment." Again, he qualifies the power he ad- 
vocates, and explains it thus: " The danger, then, consists in this : the 
President can displace fiom office a man whose merits require that he 
should be conti iued in it. What will be the motives which the President 
can feel fur such abuse of his poirir^ and the restraints to operate to pre- 
vent it ? In the fust place, he will be impeachable by this House, before 
the Senate, lor SUCH AN ACT OF MAL-AD3HMSTUAT10N ; for 



07 

r^ 9 



1 contrnd, that tlie wanton removal of meritorious ofTicers would subject 
him to impeaclimpiit, and removal from liis own high trust." Our consti- 
tutioniil lawyer then tliioks your President ought lo hu nnnovt'd from 
ofllce, if he lias acted on th^^ priuciph's avowed bv his friend'* liere, and 
says— the kind of power y.u cDiitt-nd for is \BOVK HIS CONCEP- 
TION. This does not seem to work well ; and perhaps you may now 
think our constitutional Uwyr, " who understood the C'tnstitution and 
structure of the gi)vernment as well as any man tliat ever lived," in an 
error. Tiien let us look into the opinions of others, expr^ ssid on tlie 
same occasion, who were aiding in thf establishm-^nt of this precedent, 
admired so murh. Mr. Lawrence, though an advocate of the same power, 
denied that, according to his understanding of it, it was ever to be exer- 
cised "in a wanton manner, or from capricious motives;" and, with a view 
to silence the apprehensions of those who were alarmed lest it might be 
exercised without restraint, he puts to them the question which had been 
answered by Mr. Madison — " would he (the Prpsident) not be liable to 
impeachment for displacing a worthy and ablf man, who enjoyed the con- 
fidence of the people?" Mr. V^ining, on the same side, remarked " that if 
the President should remove a valuable officer, it would be an act of 
TYRANNY which the good sense of the nation would never forget." Such 
were the views of all the prominent advocates of this right at that time. 
Do I go an inch, then, beyond your own authority when I infer, from the 
opinions of the very men upon whose judgment you now build, that the 
system of removing meritorious officers bt fore the regular ex[)iration of 
their terms of service, for either personal or party motives, is hostile to 
the spirit of the constitution, an " impeachable mal-admmislration" of the 
government, and a " tyrannical" encroachment on the liberties of the 
people ? 

But when we trace the history of the same bill in its progress through 
the Senate, it seems not to admit of a doubt that, but for the extraordinary 
concurrence of extraneous circumstances then co-operaling to produce this 
construction, the right of removal would never have been recognised, 
AVhile that bill was under consideration in this House, on the ISth July, 
1789, a motion was made to strike out of ihe cl luse, implying the existence 
of the right, the words " by the President of the United States," the object 
of which was to deny that right altogether. The Senate then sat with 
closed doors, and we have no accuunt of the discussion. But we sco 
from the records how the vote stood. Mr. Madison's constitutional opin- 
ions were then unpopular in Virginia, as being too laiitudin'irian; in con- 
sequence of which he had lost his election to the Senate, that Stale beio'^, 
at the period referred to, represented here by William Grayson and Rich- 
ard Henry Lee. Both those gentlemen voted against the power and in 
favor of the motion to strike out; and I suppose that the doctrine of strict 



28 

constructions of executive power was at that time, as it often since has 
buen, the prevailing ^en^ime^t oi the State. Georgia, Sr>uih Carolina, 
and New Hampsliire, were all united sgainst the power, and they were sup- 
ported by Johnson of Connecticut, and M iclay of Pennsylvania Ara^ng 
the fiionds of the motion we Qid Johnson, Few of Georgia, B.jtler of 
South Carolina, and Langdon of New Hampshire, who had all been mem- 
bers of the Federal Conve:ition. Nine voted for (he striking out, and 
nine against it; and Mr. Adams, th" Vice President, having given a casting 
vote in favor of the power, the words were retained. So the honorable 
geutie.-nan from Tennessee will perceive that he owes the whole of his 
favorite precedent at last to that sanie "elder Adams," the " tendencies 
of wijiise opinions" were, if we are to rely on his friend from New Hamp- 
shire, " to consolidation and monarchy." I do not call his attention to 
this fact, however, because I concur in any of these sweeping denunciations 
of thut great patriot. The same question arose again in the Senate on 
llie 4th of August, 17S9, on amotion to strike out of the bill " to establish 
an Executive Department to be denominated the Department of War," 
the words, " and who whenever the said ptini;ipal officer shall be removed 
from olfire by the President of the United States;'' and again on ttie same 
day, pending the bill " to provide for the government of a territory North 
West of the Ohio," which contained a clause recognising the right to 
remove the Governor of the territory. Similnr decisions followed in 
each of these cases ; so that the question was within three weeks thrice 
decided here; and these decisions form the grounds upon which the 
power, under its proper constitutional restraints, has ever since been claim- 
ed for the Executive. These facts, I submit, leave not a shadow of a 
doubt that, without the influence wliich the character of the Father of his 
Country was calculated to produce upon the minds of the Senators, many 
of whom were his old compatriots and most intimate friends, and without 
the powerful co-<fperation of iMr. Adams, the decisions would have been 
difle>ent. Under such circumstances, 1 would pause to inquire whetiier it 
is reasonable to suppose that the undrrstanding of those Senators who so 
established this power, was, that the President, upon whom it was conler- 
red, was to exercise it without limitation ? Is it prob^ble that uncontrol- 
led and absolute authority would have been acknowledged then, and that, 
loo, by a body of men whose patriotism and devotion to the cause oi liberty 
have never been surpassed ? 

The opinions of Mr. Adams, on this subject, are probably in a great 
measure attributable to a belief which he had indulged in oppositiuu to the 
Federal Convention, that the power ol the Senate, in regard to ap[)oint- 
Koents, ought to have been entrused to " a council selected by the President 
himself at his pltasurc^^ — in fact, a mere privy council without the aa- 
thority to check him. He thought that the people would be jealous that 



2» 

\he influence of the Senate, if it were entrusted with appointments, would 
'* be empioved to conceal, connive at, and dtfend gu\\\ iti Executive oflirers, 
instead of being a guard and watch upon them, and a terror to liicni." 
These opinions are disclosed in a correspondence which tooi\. pJHce be- 
tween him and Roger Sherman, in the summer of 1789. With these 
Opiiiiuns, lluis known to have been entertaitud by him at the very time 
when he decided by his casting vote, he went far, we now find, to destroy 
the lights of the Senate, and to reduce it to a mere privy council without 
any effective power. In^that correspondence Mr. Sherman, who had been 
a member of the Convention, urged against such opinions the views oi 
tliai Convention, which ought to have been decisive in favor of the rights 
of the Senate. " Hut," said he, " if the President was left to select a 
council for himself, though he may be supposed to be actuated by the best 
motives, — yet he would be surrounded by flairerers who would assume 
the character of friends and patriots, though they bad no attachment to the 
public good, no regard to the laws of their country, but, influenced wholly 
by self-interest, would wish to extend the power of the Executive in 
order to increase their own ; they would often advise him to dispe..se with 
laws that should thwart their schemes, and in excuse plead that it wag 
done from necessity to promote the public good — they will use their own 
influence, induce the President to use Ifus to get laws repealed, or the Con- 
stiluiion altered to extend bis powers and prerogatives, under pretext of 
advancing the public good, and gradually render the government a despo- 
tism. This seems to be according to the course of human affairs, and 
what may be expected from the nature of things." The views of Mr. 
Adams on this subject appear to have been different from those of any 
other man who participated in the decisions in 1789, of which we have 
any information now, as well as from those of the Federal Convention it- 
self. 

It is true that Washington exercised this power during his administration. 
The gentleman from Tennessee produced nine cases as the result of his 
industrious researches, which had occurred during the whole eight years 
in which Washington presided, to justify the hundieds which have b^ea 
made in the first year of this administration. But, in every instance, 
Washington's removals were made (and it will not be denied) only when 
necessary for the public good, exactly complying with the rule which had been 
established. In announcing the exercise of this right to the Senate, he 
used the word "superseded" instead of "removed" or "dismissed," which 
were subsf-quently adopted by his successors. But whether he did or did 
not consider the removals as provisional, and dependent on the future 
action of the Senate, we have no distinct information. On all f.ccasionshe 
manifested the highest respect for iis concurrent powers in the business of 
Executive appoiulnient, and prescribed a duty for a President, wiiich ha» 



30 

certainly not been regarded as such by one of bis successors, when in his 
message of the 9th of February, 17Uf>, containing a few nominations to 
supply vacancies which had been temporarily filled in the recess, he says, 
" ib'^se appointments will expire with your present session, and, indeed, 
ought net to endure lunger than until others can be regularhj marie." 

The gentleman from Tetinessfe informed us of twenty three cases in 
which Mr. Jt-flersun had removed; and then read, to justify the immensa 
proscription now made, his answer of the 12th July, ISOl, to a remon- 
strance of the committee of the merchants of New Ilaven, on the appoint- 
ment of Samuel Bishop to the office of Collector at New Haven, theu 
lately vacatf-d by the death of David Austin. That letter was doubtless 
written under some excitf^ment, caused by the memorial itself; and the 
fame of Mr. Jvflerson is rescued from the imputation now attempted to be 
cast upon it by butler evid»'nce. Yet, even in this answer, he places his 
removal upt)n the ground that it was for the public good, and to secure 
the necessary co op-ration with tlie government, expressly statiog, too, that 
his general object was to remedy the very evil now complained of. '• Dur- 
ing the late administration," says he, " the whole offices of the United 
States were monopolized by a sect," He considered that the former in- 
cumbents hid been app->inted merely for party and personal aggrandize- 
ment, and not for the public welfare. Try ths present abuses of power 
by the standard of that letter, and you find yourselves standing on the 
very doctrine which he repudiated, and the deleterious effects of which he 
says he endeavored to correct. *' I shall correct the procedure ; but that 
done, return with Joy to that state of things when the only question con- 
cerning a candidate shall be, is he honest ? — is he capable ? — is he faithful 
to the ConstituiioM ?" The last Administration removed no man for party 
motives, before the regular expiration of his term, and even went beyond 
the line prescribed by Mr. Jefferson, by regularly re-appointing political 
opponents when their oflices had expired. You now rest, therefore, on 
the principles which ,Mr. Jeffr-rsnn attributed to the elder Adams, and 
your policy, as avowed here by the Senator from Nc\y Hampshire, does 
not " follow uj) the doctrines of the great revolution of ISOO." This 
construction of the answer to the New Haven remonstrance makes Mr. 
Jefferson consistent with himself. In his letter to Mr. Gerry of the 2;)th 
March, ISOl, ho says — " officers who have been guilty of gross abuses 
of office, such as marshals, packing j'uriesy Sec. I shall now remove, as my 
predecessors ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few, 
and guided by S TRIC T KULK, and !iot party passion. The right of 
opinion shall suffer no invasion from me. Those who have acted well 
have nothing to fear, however they may have differed from me in opinion." 
In other ports of his correspondence we see the same view taken of his 
consiituiionul power. On the 6ih of July, IbOi, in a letter to David Hall, 



31 

Ihcn Governor of Delaware, he acknowledges the receipt of communica- 
tions covering two addresses, llie one from a democratic republican 
meeting at Dover, aod the oilier from the grand and general juries of the 
Circuit Court of the United States, both of them praying a removal of 
Allen McLarie, the father of our present Minister to England, from the 
office of Collector of the Customs at Wilmington. It appears ilidt Mr. 
AlcLaoe was objrcted to by them, on the ground of personal dislike, and 
for the alleged warmth of his federal opinions. Mr. Jrfl'erson, in this 
letter, replying to those addresses, refuses to remove the incumbent for such- 
reasons, "lest he should bring a just censure on his administration." He 
says, " we are oot acting for ourselves alone, but for the wiiole humati 
race. We must not, by any dc[>artitre from principle, (Wshtfarivn the mass 
of our fellow citizens." lie then Inys down the very principle on which 
this power can be constitutionally and properly exercised. " If Colonel 
McLane has done any act inconsistent with his duty as an officer, or as 
an agent of this administration, this would be legitimate ground for in- 
quiry, into which I should consider myself free to enter." He takes a 
distinction between refusing to appoint a political opponent, and removing 
him during his term, the last of which he refuses to do: — thus leaving 
your thousand removals from the I'ost Oflice and other Departments of 
the government under the full reprobation of the " doctrines of ISOI," 
upon which you have attempted to justify them. 

The next President whose removals were referred to by the gentleman 
from Tennessee, was Mr. Madison, our " constitutional lawyer" under 
whose opinions we have already seen there is no shelter to be found for 
this administration. Then came Mr. Monroe, who not only disavowed 
such policy as is now pursued, but practised political tolerance in its 
widest signification. He had a great constitutional lawyer to advise him — 
one whose precepts ought to be now adhered to, even as strongly as the 
gentleman from Tennessee grasped those of Mr. Madison. That consti- 
tutional lawyer, bir, was Andrew Jackson, whose advice on any question 
should not be slightingly []assed over by the gentleman from Tennessee, 
and especially when we aro considering the special force and efficacy of 
the second section of lbi« article, in the Constitution. On the l2th of No- 
vember, ISlG, before Mr. Monroe's election had been ollicially announced, 
he gives this magnanimous view of the duties of a Chief Magistrate : " In 
every selection, parly and party feelings should be avoided. Now is the 
time to exterminate that monster, called parly spirit. By selecting charac- 
tcrs most ccmspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity and firmness, 
without any regard to [>arly, you will go far to, if not entirely eradicate, 
those feelings which on former occasions threw so many obstacles in the 
way of government, and perhaps have the pleasure and honour of uniting 
a people heretofore politically divided. Th<j Chief Magistrate of a great 



and powerful nation slioulil never indulge in parly feeling. His conduct 
should l)e liberal and di>iii)ieresi*'.J, almays bearing in mind tbat he ao4s 
for the whole, and not a part of the commuoii y. B> this course you will 
exalt the national character, and acquire for yourself a name as imperish- 
ablp as monumental marble. Consult no party in your choice : pursue 
the dictates of that unerring judgment which has so long and so often be- 
nefitted our country, and rendered conspicuous its rulers. These are the 
sentiments ot a trif^nd ; they are the feelmgs, if 1 know my own heart, of 
an undissembied patriot." It may be said. Sir, that this constitutional 
lawyer has since abandoned these views as unsound. But I ask when ? 
Why, as late as May, 1824, he maintained the same moral and mental 
elevation, confirming the same opinions, and iraprioting them more deeply 
by the increased authoritative sanction of his own great name. In a letter 
to the Hon. George Kremer, of that date, so far froni retracting them, he 
says, " My advice to the President was, that he should act upon principles 
like these : — Consider himself th' head of the Nation, not of a party ; that 
he should have around him the best talents the country could afford, with- 
out regard to seciionnl divisions; and should, in his selection, seek after 
men of probity, virtue, capacity and firmness ; and, in this way, he would 
go far to eradicate those feelings which, oo former occasions, threvT se 
many obstacles in the way of government, and be enabled perhaps to 
unite a p^'ople heretof/re politically divided," Those who delight to view 
the result of the last Presidential election as a verdict rendered by the peo- 
ple on an issue joined, can best inform us hnw far these sentiments and 
constitutional opinions should be viewed as having formed a part of that 
issue, and how far they were sanctioned by the then expression of pop. 
ular appiobatioa. 

These opinions and precedents of great constitutional lawyers lead us 
lo other r^fl^•cti^«ns upon the general expediency of the two doctrines, and 
the probable reasoning of those who made our constitution. By the old 
articles of confederation, the power of appointment was vested in Congress. 
Under the present Constitution the same power was transferred to the 
President and Senate. The House of Representatives, chosen bien- 
nially, was not entrusted with atiy portion of this important power. Why 
not? Honorable gentlemen have strongly pressed the importance of what 
they call the principle of rotation or change in office, to comply wiih the 
popular wUI. The House of Representatives being entirely subj^^cl to the 
mutability of popular opinion, would be most apt to change with every 
popular breeze, and give effect to that opinion. Did this escape the 
intellects of the fathers of the Ref»ublic ? Sir, if we are to accredit their 
cotrmporrtnrous expositions of the Constitution, and tbe very writings 
whirl) prociirrd its raiific ition, their reason for not investint; the Represen- 
tatives with this power, was to preveol iho removal of valuable officers 



33 

with every popular change, aad to give stability to tl)C administration of liio 
government. Moreover, when the gpntieman from New Hampsliire states 
here, that liie same poiiiical causes which iuJucc the people to clian^o 
their Chief Magistrate, siioukl operate upon all the subordinates, ageuts and 
deputies, he torgets that the popular attention never is, and never can be 
while absorbed by the consideration of the merits and demerits of contend- 
ing candidates for the first office in their giti, sufliciently diverted to decide 
upon all the officers in the country. In a State or a small territory where 
the people know all their officers, they may act with a view to ihcni. 
But hundreds of ihousmds voted, during the last great political contest, lur 
men politically opposed to oflkers whom they had never seen, and of 
whom they knew nothing — nay, to their dearest Iriends whom they neither 
wished nor expected should be removed. You cannot justify your course, 
then, by saying it is the popular will, and especially when your President 
with his election in full view, and with a knowledge of the efl'eci of the sen- 
timent on the public, lold us that "the Chief Magistrate of a great and power- 
ful nation should never indulge in party feeling." Under such circumstau- 
ces, is it not fair to conclude, that if his election musj be regarded as any 
expression of popular will, in regard to subordinate officers, that will was in 
favor of his sentiment, and against the indulgence of party feeling to remove 
them. Still I admit that although the great mass of the nation know liule 
and care less, in the election of a President, about the qualificatiims of 
inferior olTicers, yet they have in recent practice been too much 
guided in their choice by the hopes of Executive patronage, and the love 
of office. And it is time to lay before them the true principles of their 
Constitution, which teach that for the gratification of personal ambition 
or the mere elevation of a party, for private pique or for personal ven- 
geance, for the free exercise of the right of opinion, for hatred or fur favor- 
itism, or for any other cause than to secure a faithful discharge of public 
service for the public good, Executive power cannot be legitimately exer- 
cised; and shall now and forever after be eflectually and fearlessly restrain„ 
ed. The expectants " for dead men's shoes" will then disappear. The 
elective franchise will be restored to its pristine purity. Executive pa- 
tronage will no longer teach us at the polls that "power over a man's sup- 
port is power over his will," and the action of our government will, by thus 
cleansing the very spring froni which it flows, become henceforth refined 
lieaUhful, and vigorous. But if these principles be now disregarded, despised 
and prostrated, our people will be converted into office hunters, the contest 
for power will be every where conducted without reference to principle, the 
elective franchise will sink under the influence of personal hopes and 
personal fears, universal corruption will be substituted for that virtue with- 
out which a republic cannot exist, and at the expiration of every four years 
the tumult will swell, and the venality will fester, until, the depravity of the 



34 

whole system of government being no longer tolerable, — disgusted, d^jected, 
and dispirited by the complete failure of our attempt at self-government, 
we shall sink into the arms of the first Ca;sar who shall be willing to strike 
a mortal bldw at the liberties of his country. Let me not be told, then, that 
the moel sacred of our constitutional privileges is to become the victim of 
any slovenly draftsman of a commission or a statute, confounding Executive 
power with Executive pleasure. By the paramount law of the land, a Pre. 
sident can officially know no pleasure but the people's interest, and when 
you suffer him to sink the olTicer in the man, you violate its simplest and 
most salutary restrictions. 

With this vjpw of the duties of a Chief Magistrate, and of bis constitu- 
tional power, it must occur that as his authority to remove can be exercised 
only for cause, there must be some tribunal to inquire into and ascertaia 
that cause. I regard this right, though denied by thegpntleman from Ten- 
Dessee, as a necessary incident of the advisory power of the Senate. Ws 
know well that here is a great dividing line between us in this body. One 
parly here denies our constitutional right to put such troublesome questions, 
or to test any part of the groundwork of our *• great and glorious reform.^' 
We want to learn a little of the rationale of this operation. We have been 
all along, as you tell us, benight*-d and in the dark. Give us light, then, we 
say. We consider ourselves bound to advise the Chief Magistrate in his 
appointments. We are not restricted to a mere expression of consent to, 
or dissent from, his nomination. We may, aye, must go further. If you 
ask me whether I will consent to a choice which you alone can make, I may 
answer, yes. But if you ask me whether I will advise you so to choose, I 
might point you to a better. The words advice and consent are not 
synonymous — their meaning is essentially different. Consent is the mere 
agreement of the mind to what is proposed by another. Advice ordinarily 
implies the recommendation of some opinion, or the offering of some infor- 
mation worthy to be weighed and acted upon by another. The gentleman 
from Tennessee, expressing an opinion current, as we all know, among his 
political friends here, denies the constitutional right of the Senate tu exam- 
ine into and judge of the propriety of removals from office, and declares 
that our power is confined to the question of fitness or unfitness of the per- 
son nominated to succeed. Now, if A. be removed from oftice, and B nom- 
inated to supply the vacancy, were only our consent asked on the appoint- 
ment of B, we might possibly, adopting his construction, vote aye ; when, if 
we are are asked whether wo would advise as well as consent to the appoint- 
ment, we might answer, "no; we know a thousand better men, though we 
do not think the nominee absolutely unfit. We think the man removed is 
a better man." It is said, however, that we must restrict our advice to the 
nomination before us, and that, if we go beyond that, it is advice un.isked. 
I answer that even if I am^ as his adviser, to consult the interests of the Pre^ 



35 

slJont alone, I cannot always know whether ?> will really suit his purposes, 
until I learn why A has been removed, and thus ascertain what his pur- 
poses are. He may be deceived either in the character or qualifications of 
his nominee, and we knowing, perhaps, more abnut them than the President, 
if bound to look to his interests alone, ought to advise him of his error. Is 
it our object to advise him to appoint such persons as will aggrandize him- 
self or sustain his party? He may have recommended one of the opposite 
party to supply the vacancy created by th e removal of his own party man. 
With a view to his interest then, as his adviser, we ought, I suppose, to tell 
him so. Well, I inform him of it, and he tells me in reply that he knew 
that, but has dismissed his old friend because he has lost his influence. 
Then, if I know it to be a fact that his nominee has lost his influence too, I 
should tell him so — should I not ? How then, even according to the views 
of those who think the President is to consult his own pleasure, can we be 
faithful advisers without asking in our confidential way here, what that 
pleasure is, or terreting out the causes of his removals ? On the other hand, 
if I am to advise with an eye single to the public good, which I take to be 
iTjy true standard, I ought not to advise him to appoint B when I know that 
A, whom he has removed, and can re-appoint, is a better man for the office. 
Is it not then expedient for us — nay, is it not sometimes absolutely neces- 
sary to the proper discharge of our advisory duties, to learn why our ser- 
vants have been dismissed ? And if so, where is the clause in the Consti- 
tution which limits us in the exercise of these duties ? If we have, as gentle- 
men say, no constitutional right to inquire into the causes of these removals, 
we have no power to investigate the propriety of appointments to fill the 
vacancies ; for the first of these principles being conceded, the other will 
flow as a consequence from the concession. This makes the President 
independent of the Senate in his appointing power, and of course of any 
other tribunal established by the Constitution, And the Senator from New- 
Hampshire has reminded us, in discussing another topic of this debate, that 
Mr. Jefferson's "axiom of eternal truth in politics" was, "that whatever power 
in any government is independent is absolute also." I apprehend, too, that (his 
new restrictive construction of our constitutional duties differs entirely from 
that adopted by all our predecessors. True, their Executive records show 
that the subject has not been moved on every nomination ; yet the right to 
•xercise the power appears not to have been denied before, and those records 
show us that the Senate has often inquired into the propriety of nomina- 
tions and of removals also. When Robert Purdy memorialized this body 
on the 15th of January, 1822, representing, as he did, that his removal from 
the army had been improperly made, and even charging, expressly, that 
favoritism, with the President, " had superseded the claims of merit," the 
Senate, instead of deciding against their own power, or branding it as 
inquisitoiial, appointed a committee to investigate the whele subject : and 



36 

on the 13th of April afterwardi, they, by resolution, called for the report 
of the board of general officers upon which the leductionaod new arrange- 
mpni of the army had been predicated. When Mr. Monroe nominated 
Gadsden as Adjutant General, and Tovvson and Fenwick as Colonels, the 
Senate looked behind the nominations, and took cognisance of the fact that 
other oflicers were su^^-erseded and disbanded as supernumeraries ; and 
although, as appears by the able reports of the committee which inves- 
tigaied the causes and the legality of the arrangement, they did anipl* jus- 
tire to the merits of these gallant officers, and admitted them to be fully 
competent for the stations to supply which the Pre-'^ident had named them to 
the Senate, jet the nominations were not confirmed. Gadsden and Tow" 
son were rejected here on the l6th of March, 1822, and the nomination of 
Fenwick was then withdrawn. The Piesident afterwards le-nominated 
them to the Senate, when the same investigation was again made; the 
Committee called on the War Department for more full information; the 
President assigned all his reasons in an elaborate message to the Senate; 
iht committee reported against those reasons, with a full argument to refute 
them, and the Senate a second time rejected all these appointments, on the 
ground that other persons were entitled to them. Here was no cry of 
inquisitorial power, nor did the Senate consider, as th^ gentleman from 
Tennessee now does, that their power was conjined to the question of fit- 
ness or unfitness oj the nomintes. On the lOth of April, 1822, the Senate, 
by resolution, instructed the Secretary of the Navy, among other things, to 
communicate to them, in Executive session, " in what situations and for 
what reasons acting appointments of officers are made in the Navy Depart- 
ment." It will not be pretended that the mere fact, that the call was not 
directly on the Chief Magistrate, impairs the force of the precedent, as a 
demand of the causes of Executive action. Cases in which the Senate has 
inquired into the causes of appointments have often occurred. On the 4th 
of January, 1826, the Senate, by resolution, called "for any information 
tending to sho7P the propriety of sending Ministers to Panama ;" and it does 
not appear by the Journal that the majority, so much reproached for ihei 
defence of the then administration, made any objection to the rcsolulioOj 
but it does appear that the resolution was on that day offered by Mr. 
Macon, and was immediately adopted. In the case of William B. Irish; 
who was nontinated by Mr. Monroe as Marshal of the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, the Senate called, by resolution, on " the President of the 
United States, to cause to be laid before them all such letters and petitions, or 
ottier piipcrs, as were presented to him relative to the appointment, as icell 
those which opposed his appointment, as those wiiich requested it," and 
ihe President complied with the call, without complaining against th» 
Senate for having exorcised power unconstitutionally or impropeily. The 
first President of the Tnitcd States, who was also the President of the Conven- 



37 

tion tbat made ilie Constitution, considered the Senate as entitled to ilie 
utmost latitude of inquiry. When they rejected his nomination of Benja- 
min Fishbourtie, for ihe place of Naval OlVicer of the Port of Savannah. 
Washine;ton, in his message nominatijig Lachlan Mcintosh for the place, 
says — " Permit me to submit to your consideration, whether on occasions 
where the propriety of nominations may appear questionable to you, it 
would not be expedient to communicate that cir<umstance to me, and there- 
by avail yourselves of the information which led me to make them, and 
which I would icith pleasure lay before youP A committee was then 
appointed to wait on the President, and confer with him on the mode of 
communication proper to be observed between him and the Senate, in the 
formation of treaties and making appointments to offices. This committee, 
by their chairman, Mr. Izzard, on the 21st of August after, reported the 
very rule of the Senate now to be found in our manual as No. 3G, 
which, with the very view to give time for these inquiries, provides that 
when nominations shall be njad^, a future day shall be assigned, linless the 
Senate unanimously direct otherwise, for taking them into consideration — 
prescribes the form of arrangement, when the President shall meet the 
Senate to give or to receive information, and even directs their own atten- 
dance at any othpr place where he may convene them for such purposes. 
With this history of that rule, which hds been carefully preserved by all our 
predecessors, but appears now to be forgotten, who can doubt that, in their 
opinion, the utmost latitude of inquiry was to be allowed to the Senate on 
all Presidential nominations? We have high authority in favor of uur 
constitutional light to inquire, in the report of the committee on Execu- 
tive patronage made in this body on the 4lh of May, 1826 — a committee 
which then thought, as they informed the world, tluit they were " acting 
in the spirit of tht Constitution in laboring to multiply the guards, and to 
strengthen the barriers, against the possible abuse of power." The second 
section of the second bill reported by that committee provides, " That, in 
all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies 
occasioned by an exercise of the President's power to remove iVom office, 
the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate, at the same time that 
the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons fur which such 
officer may have hcen removed.''^ Now, Sir, would that committee* have re- 
ported an unconstitutional provision for the adoption of the Senate? The pro- 
position in it was to exercise the right of inquiry in every case ^ and thus by one 
sweeping clause to supersede the necessity of any future resolutions for that 
purpose in particular cases. Why now consider the doctrine unconstitutional 
which was thus supported? So highly were the principles of this 

* The names of those who cocnpos°d the Committee in Executive patronage, arc 
Messrs. Benton, (chairraan,) Macon, Van Buren. Whit**. rmdi»y, Dickerioo, Holme*. 
Hsjne, und Johnsou of IJeiilucUy. 



3S 

report then approved, that six thousand copies were ordered to be printed 
and the arguments contained in it were then declared to be unanswerable.'^ 
These inquiries were all right tliPiiy and the thdught that it was wrong "to estab- 
lish a court of inquiry" did not occur to the Conuniltee. So, too, the House 
of Representaiivps, in the exercise of its i^^gislaiive powers, has scrutinized 
the motives ol the Heads of Executive Departments. That House de- 
manded, by resolution, on the 8th of May, 1822, from the Secretary of the 
Treasury, " a particular and minute account of each transfer of the public 
money from one Bank, to another, which had been made after the first of 
January, 1817, and the reasons and motives for making the same; ''^ and 
in March, 1822, they obtained ihe information demanded, in a report. 
By us the right to look into the causes of executive action is no' claimed 
as an incident of the mere legislative power of the Senate, but of its execu- 
tive authority, and therefore stands on much stronger grounds. 

Tn 1821, the Senate thinking a charged'' affaires not a proper representa- 
tive of this government at Rio Janeiro, interfered to recoranend the ap- 
pointment of a Minister. Their opinion on that subject had not been re- 
quested, when, by their resolution of the 3d of March of that year, they 
advised the President to appoint such a minister. The act was voluntary 
and gratuitous. They did not then regard it as an objection that their 
advice was unasked, nor consider themselves confined to the fitness or 
unfitness of the charge d\iffaires. They did not feel bound to remain si- 
lent, like the slaves around the throne of a despot, and answer only when 
spoken to. And it appears to me that on subjects connected with either 
treaties or appointments, before the election of the present Chief Magis- 
trate, they have considered themselves, in the spirit of the Constitution, and 
under the solemn obligation to advise the President which it imposed up- 
on them, equally bound to warn him of approaching danger to the country, 
and to consult with him on the means of averting it : equally hound to give 
him information which coulc tend to increase the welfare and prosperity of 
that country, and to discuss with him the means of securing and promoting 
it, whether he had or had not first asked their advice. Would you. Sir, 
regard him as a faithful adviser, and a true friend, who should never warn 
you of danger, or give you information until you asked him to do so ? And 
if not, sre we acting in the spirit of the Constitution when we restrict our 
advice to the President to the mere fitness or unfitness of his nominee ? 

The treaty making, as well ns the appointing power, is vested in the Pre- 
sident and Senate. The advice and consent of this body is an indispen- 
sable prerequisite to the ratification of all treaties, and is an essential com- 
ponent part of the power to make them. It necessarily looks as well to the 
annulled as to the annulling stipulations with other nations ; has always 

' By Mr. Raodolph. 



39 

rejected new treaties, when preferring old ones; and though indulging the 
utmost latitude of inquiry into all the reasons, and all the facts connected 
with both, it has never yet been met with objections to the most ample ex- 
ercise of these powers. 

It is well understood, Sir, that within the year of which this day com- 
pletes the circle, a great revolution has been effected, in the public ofgcHs, 
by the discharge of the former incumbents, and that the representatives of 
many of tlie States are anxious to spread upon the records here, for the 
benefit of posterity, as well as of the present age, the latent cause of this great 
Executive rr/br/H. We have another motive to make the effort to effect 
this. We desire that thesimple factsshouldappear, in justice to all those who 
have been dismissed from the public service without charge or accusatioa 
against them. We consider this necessary as an act of justice, n(>f only to 
the sufferers, but to their families, their friends and their posterity. We seek 
to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, to exhibit to public view, among 
the searching operations of this government, how many have been removed 
on the representations of secret foes, or vindictive political opponents ; 
how many have been dismissed on suspicion, and how m^ny without sus- 
picion ; and how many have been condemned without having been suffered 
to learn the nature of the accusations ai^aiust them. If rumours, founded 
in many cases on the statements of the victims of the prescriptive system, be 
true, many have been hurled from stations, which they have filled with 
honour to themselves, and with advantage to the public, without the as- 
signment of any reason for the act ; and in many instances, it is said, the 
files of departments here have been filled with foul calumnies, by aspirants 
to office, and their secret agents, without giving the accused even the for- 
mality of a trial. If this be so, here is a real inquisition, to rack and tor- 
ture, not the bodies indeed, but the characters of men. Is it mne than an 
act of justice, to the victims, that the truth should appear ? The accusa- 
tions against them, though strictly ex parte, are yet the avowed foundation o. 
official acts of departments here, and are matters of record on file, in those 
departments, which may be resorted to, by all future generations, to black! 
en the memory of these men, and to disgrace their families, when they 
shall be laid in their graves. In a government of laws properly adminis 
tered, the disciuirge of a public servant, without any assigned reason for 
the act, must ordinarily cast some imputation upon his character. No mat 
ter how innocent he may be — no matter whether any charge has or has 
not been preferred against him, yet the existence of such charges will be 
presumed. Under such circumstances, the breath of calumny is sure to 
stain his reputation, even though acquired by a long life of faithful public 
service, and exemplary private conduct. Tho hireling libeller, the prosti- 
tuted wretch, who may have gained the very office from which he has been 
femoved, will sound the tocsin of slander, and if the press has been gen- 



40 

erally subsidized by the government, surmises of ofTicial delinquency will 
be carefully propagated, as " proved on file," until the victim loses char- 
acter, as well as office, by the action of Executive vengeance. To what 
tribunal then should he appeal for justice ? I answer, to the Senate ol his 
country, a party to the contract by which he was employed, and which, bv 
fairly sliowing the causes of his dismissal, may repel the imputations rest- 
ing on his reputation, and " set history right ;" thus forming a barrier 
againstthe influence of a spirit of malevolence, whirbiu these latter days, as 
■we have seen, can pursue a man to his grave (or vengeance on his pos- 
terity. No good or honorable man will dismiss a faithful servant from his 
private employment, without furnishing him at his request with a certificatg 
of his fidelity. The some justice, which we dispense in private life, 
should be yielded to a faithful public servant, when dismissed from public 
employment; and unless as public men we intend to abandon those princi- 
ples which govern us in our social and domestic relations, we are 
in my humble judgment, bound to entertain these inquiries. They 
can do no injustice to the Executive. If its power has not been wantonly 
abused, the conduct of the government will he presented to the people in 
an unexceptionable point of view. But, on the other hand, if the President's 
authority has been perverted entirely to party and personal purposes, are 
we not bound to correct the evil, and should we refuse to present him to 
this nation in his proper character, at the expense of the reputation of all 
our fellow citizens, who have been trampled under foot [ly the arbitrary and 
despotic exercise of power ? Will it not be said that, by shrinking from 
ihe investigation, we have distrusted his integrity, and have shown a 
belief that his security was in concealment ? If all has been rightly done, 
do we not treat him ungenerously by refusing him an opportunity of pre- 
senting the evidence for his acquittal at the bar of public opinion — aye, 
Sir, at the bar of public opinion ; for at that bar he must stand and await 
his sentence; and his direst foe could not wish him a moie certain condemna- 
tion than inevitably awaits him unless he is heard in his defence. 

If I am right in my views of the constitutional powers of the President 
«nd Senate thus far presented, the former can never properly remove an 
officer before the expiration of his term, but for cause connected only with 
the public interest ; while the latter can investigate that cause, and ascertain 
by the facts how far the Constitution has been complied with ; and, if this 
authority has been abused, or extended boyond its constitutional 
limits, the House naay impeach the author of such abuses before the Senate, 
and the Senate may remove him and all his minions. An impeachment, 
however, requiring a majority of the House to prefer it, and two-thirds of 
tiic Senate to sustain ii,c;in rarely, perhaps never, prevail against the excr- 
••ise of Executive patronage directly on Congress and the influence of 
parly spirit. Tiien suppose tliat a President, regardless of Ins duty, and of 



41 

the consequences either of exposure or impeachmonl, should remove all our 
public servants wlio would not assent to his usurpalion of the sovereignly 
of ihf people, and fill their places with favorites and parasites who should 
seek to robe hitn with the imperial purple ? We liave bfcn told that 
such a case may occur — that Aaron Burr was once on the verge of this 
high oflice, and it has been said that he would have filled every office in 
this w;ty. I do not say so mysilf, nor do I pretend to decide upon that. 
But the question now arises — what checks have thf people upon a usurper 
who should do these things for his own advancement, immediately after 
his accession to the Presidency ? It is certain that, until the expirati n of 
his four years' term, a period long enough for the achievement of a revo- 
lution, the people have no chf^ck upon Wim except, t/iroiif^h the iiistrumoi- 
talitif of the Senate ; and in such a case the question j-Thut control has the 
Senate upon this power becomes one of intense interest to the American 
people. 

We have seen that, by the terms of the Constitution, the President is 
authorized to fill up all vacancies happening in the recess of the Senate, 
by granting commissions which shrill expire at the end of their next Ses- 
sion. When a vacancy is created by a removal, the ques-tion arises, can 
the officer removed be reinstated by the direct action of the Senate ? 

There are many who maintain the affirmative of this question. Some 
for whose judgments 1 feel great deference, and with whom [ usually act 
here, have so expressed themsflves ; and there are certainly strong opinions 
to support them. That of Alexander Hamilton, expressed in the 77ih 
number of the F'ederalist, is urged with much force as being in accordance 
with this construction. After enumerating there, as one of the advantages 
to be expected from the co-operativm ol the Senate in the business of ap- 
pointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration, 
he adds, " the consent of that body will be necessary to displace as well 
as to appoint." It is insisted that the displacing here referred to, is indi- 
cated by the context to be, not a temporary removal by a temporary 
appointment, amounting only to an "attempt to change," but that the 
power denied by him to exist in the President alone, was such a dis|)lncing 
power as could defy the "discountenance of the Senate" — and tha', tliere- 
fore, this great statesman pressed it upon his countrymen as one of the 
highest recommendations of the Constitution, that " a change of the Chief 
Magistrate would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the 
officers of government as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer 
of offices. Where a man in any station has given satisfactory evidence 
of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting 
a change in favor of a person more agreeal)Ie to him, by the a[)preheiision 
that the discountenance of the Senate might frustrate tlie attempt. Those 
who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most 
disposed to prize a provision which connects the official existence of public 
Ci 



42 

iiirii rviili llie approbation or disapprobalinn of that body, tvhicli, from the 
greater permanency of itsuwu composition, will, in all probability, be less 
subj'-ct to inconstancy than any other member of the government." The 
Wfif;lit of Hamilton's opinion is here set in full array against the advocates 
of constructive power ; and it is true that his exposition of the Constitution 
was cotemporaneous with its ratification ; that it was then given to, anti 
pressed upon, our countrymen, for the purpose of ellecling that ratification; 
that it was view*'d at the tin)e as obviating all objections to the extent of 
Executive iiiHuence ; and that, perhaps, the only censure which has ever 
been cast upon his political writings, charges that he was too much dis- 
posed not to curtail, but to extend and increase the powers of the Federal 
Government. Yet, his doctrine, at least to the extent contended for, was 
not recognised by the House of Represf-ntatives in 17S9 ; and if the deci- 
sions of that day, which have been reft^rred to, are to be regarded as obli- 
gatory upon us, the Senate has no direct action upon the removals of the 
President. The question recurs then, by what constitutional mode can it 
maintain any check upon these abuses of Executive power? 

I take the true difl'erence, between the present advocates of that power 
and myself, to consist in this: — thfV consider the Senate as standing in 
the relation of a quasi privy council to the "President, who may or may 
not abide by their advice, as to him shall seem most expedient. They 
deny the doctrine of Hamilton, that " the Constitution connects the cfii- 
cial existence of poblic men with the approbation or disapprobation of the 
Senate" They deny the whole and every part of it They deny it in 
every view which can be taken of it. 1 consider the Senate as possessing 
certain Executive powers, to be exercised in co-operation wiih the Presi- 
dent when they approve of the Administration of hisco ordinate powers, 
or in opposition to, and as ;i salutary check upon him when he has abused 
such powers ; and that, as officers of a certain grade cannot be appointed 
without tht-ir advice and consent, so if those officers be removed to reward 
partisanSjOr for any other unjustifiable purpose, the Srnate can reject nomina- 
tions to supply the vacancies thus cccasiont-d, and thus either compel the 
President to reinstate those remnved, or leave vacancies jr//jV/j /(c aiHnoi 
f^upply after the expiration of their session. If this view be sound, the 
Senate, by its legiiimate, though indirect action upon every removal, has a 
check upon the abuse of power) which, if exercised when the public inter- 
est really deniands it, will destioy the motives for thai abuse, and may 
hereafter save the Republic in her hour of greatest peril. The objects to 
be attained by an ambiiious and designing President, through the instru- 
mentality (,\ ihrse removals, w ill b(! to displace the real friends of the peo- 
ple, and to fill up the vacancies with tiis own creatures, subservient to his 
will, and intTepend^-M of all i)ther control ; and if the Senate have the vir- 
tue to reject his propositions to eflVct these ends, he may be compelled to 
retract his removals, or to leave the places vacaut. This right of rejecting 



4:} 

tsppoiiifments, with ihe express Jcsign of acting upon llie removals, shonl.J 
be exercised whenever liio removing power has been abused — because 
every sucIj abuse is an act of lyranny, and iho firsl ap|)ruaches of usur- 
pation, or oppreskivo and arbitrary power, shoidd be repidsnd by tlidso 
who ought to stand as the most vigi ant and intrepid among ijie sentinels 
of hberly. Ordinaiily, lie who accepts an appointment to fdl a vacancy 
occasioned by such an abuse of power, id cognisant of the facts, and con- 
senting to the abuse. Moreover, this check should be interposed wl\enever 
the public interest demands the restoration of a meritorious olllcer, whether 
removed throiigli inadvertent error or intt^iuional injustice. The Senate 
thought it important to exercise this right in the cases of the military nom- 
inations in 18-!2; but the privilege becomes inestimably valuable when- 
ever the removing puwer of a President is exerted for the purposes of per- 
sonal ambition, and in utter contempt of the public interest. It is infi- 
nitely better to go wiiiiout an oflker than to submit to " an act of tyranny''^ 
in any shape. We have no right to originate bills for raising revenue — 
we cannot nominaif" or propose in the first instance the sums to be levied 
on the people ; but when the other House sends here such bills, we can 
amend or reject them. Now, whenever we believe that the sum to be 
raised is destined for any purpose which is tyrannical or oppressive, or not 
really necessary for the public interest, we are bound to negative the whole 
bill, if we are not allowed to amend it to suit that interest. We should, 
doubtless, refuse any appropriation of public money if we believed it des- 
tined to advance the interests of an usurper, although satisfied at the same 
time that a real evil might grow out of the want of funds to disburse the 
ordinary expenses of government. In these and all similar cases the ques- 
tion must be weighed and decided, whether the object to be achieved is 
worthy of the sacrifice it may occasion ; and so long as the spirit of our 
ancestors dwells within these walls, we shall rarely think any sacrifice too 
great, if made in a successful resistance to the oppressive exercise of arbi- 
trary power. 

But there are some here who maintain that we have no such check on 
the Executive, and that the President is authorized to fdl all vacancies e/is/- 
ing in the recess of the Senate ; so that when wc have rejected such ap- 
pointments as have been proposed to us, and, having been informed by the 
President that our services are no longer necessary here ; shall have ad- 
journed without day, he may fill the vacancies l/un existing. If this be 
true, he can fill such vacancies as well with one person as •^nothe^, and of 
course can, and will generally, re-appoint the very man whom we have re- 
jected ; or, he may entirely dispense with future nominations to the Sen- 
ate, granting, on the day after each session, commissions which shall ex- 
pire with iho next, and thus take away from this co-ordinate branch of 
power even the miserable subordinate privilege of the old French I'arlia- 
mcnt whose only glory was to register the mandates of the sovereign. 



44 

The comnienfafor on Justinian, who has been alluded to, as a jurist, n 
terms of higl) commendation, in (he range of tliis di bate, (Mr. Coopeb,) 
after animadverting upon the removing power as lormerly exercised by 
the Governor of Pennsylvania, says, the analogy between the rights of the 
Governor and those of the Fiesident, in this respect, will not hold, " con- 
sidering that under the constitution of the United Stales the exercise of ihe 
light of removal is subject to the formidable check of the Senate's concur- 
rence in the succesor of the President — a difference so important as to 
destroy the force of all reasoning from the one to the other. A poiccr in 
every instance controlled in its exercise by the Senate, cannot he compart d 
U'itha power in evert/ instance uncontrolled, and i xeicised as the caprice of 
ihe Governor for the lime being, hf-ated by rei ent opposition, and goaded 
by revenge, may dictate." The distinction lies here, — every vacancy ex- 
isting in the recess is not a vacancy happening within the true construction 
of the second article. Tlie appointmems to sup|)ly such vacancies must 
be made " by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the 
next session'" — not after the expiration of that session. The com- 
missions granted during the last recess expire, eo instunti, with the de- 
termination of the present session ; and if the offices are not filled by the 
concurrence of the Senate, vacancies will exist at the moment we adjourn, 
not in the recess — for that moment can with no more propriety be said to be 
recess, than session — and those vacancies will not exist by reason of any casu' 
ally or happening not provided for, but by the expressed will of a co-ordinate 
branch of the appointing power. It has never been pretended that the 
President alone could fill, by one of these temporary appointments, a va- 
cancy happening during the session. In the celebrated report of the com- 
mittee on military affairs, made hereon the 25th of April, 1822, which, as 
I have already stated, met with the sanction of the Senate in the rejection 
of the military appointments, it is urged that " the word hoppcn relates to 
some casualty not provided for by law. If the Sen;ite be in session when 
offices are created by law wliich were not before filkd, and nominations be 
not made to them by the President, lie cannot appoint at'ter the adjourn- 
ment of the Senate, unless specially authorized by law, such vacancy not 
happening during the recess." The same construction was evidently adopt- 
ed by Congress, and by the President himself, when, in the act of the 22d 
of July, ISlS, they thought it necessary to insert an express provision ia 
the second section, to confer upon the President the power to appoint 
collectors of direct taxes and intrrruil duties during the recess, if not be- 
fore made by and with the consent of the Senate. Every vacancy existing 
in the recess, is not therefore a vacancy " happening in the recess." In 
the third section of the first article of the Constitution, touching the 
appointment of Senators, it is provided that, " if vacancies happen by 
resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any State, 
the Executive theieof may make temporary appointments, until the next 



45 

meeting of ihe f^pgishiture, which shall then till sucii vacancies.*' Thpsp 
icniporary appoinlmeiits by iho State Executive are anal gous to tempo- 
rary app. intnifnts by the National Fxfciitive, How, thon, has this clause 
in the Constitution been construed ? The first case which occurred, to 
test its construction, was decided on the 2Sth of JMarch, 17!)4, on an 
appointment by the Executive of Delaware, wiiich appears to have un- 
dergone a full invrslipatiiin. The report of the commiiiee appointed to 
examine it, sets forth, that a Senator trom that State resigned his scat upon 
the 1 Sih day of September, 1793, and during the recess of the Legislature; 
that tlip Legislature met in Jaimary, and adjourned in February, 1794 ; 
' that upon the iQih day o{ March, and subsequently to the adjournment of 
the Legislature, anoiher was appointed by the Governor to fill the vacancy 
occa«i..ned by ih^ resignation. With these facts, u resolution was reported 
by the committee, and adopted by a vote of twenty to seven, that the 
appointee was not entitled to a seat here, "because a session o! the Lejjis- 
lature of the said State had intervened between the resignation and 
tiie appointnjent;" and among those who sustained this resolution, we find 
the names of Langdon, King, Cllstvorth, Martin, and Butler, who had 
been members of the Convention. Such was the determination on this 
question, going the whole lengtli of the principle we s^ek to establish. 
In the case of Mr. Lanman, a Senator from Connecticut, the Senate, on 
the 7th of March, 1825, went still further. His term expired on the 
3d of March, 1825 ; after which, he produced here a certificate of 
appointment by Olive.'- Wolcot, then Governor of the State, dated the Sth 
of February, 1825 — and althoug'^ the Legislature of the State was not in 
session at the time, and did not sit until May, yet the Senate decided that 
there was not in this case a vacancy happening by any casualty not pro- 
vided for, and therefore Mr. Lanman was not ruiitled to a seat. We 
find among the distinguished nuines then recorded in favour of this con- 
struction, those of Messrs. Benton, Berrien, Dickerson, Ealon, Gaillard, 
Hayne, JACKSON (now President,) King, Loyd of Maryland, Macon, 
Tazewell, and f^au Buren. It is not for me to pronounce upon the cor- 
rectness of a decision thus established ; but if it was right, ;t not only 
covers, but goes beyond my p.-silion. It is true ih^t in some sitnilar cases 
Senators have been permitted to sit here ; but they all passtd without con- 
sideration, except that of Mr. Trac}', who was held entitled to a seat, by a 
party vole, in a period of high excitement — all those who weie called 
federalists voting for, and all those who were called devwcrals, against 
him. Tcmpnra mutantnr. However we may be branded as the feder- 
alists of this (lay, our doctrine appears to have been the Republican doc- 
trine of that period. The constitutions cf each of the States, in the 
cases refened to, provided that their governors should see that thtir 
laws tcere faUhJuUy executed ; and their laws directed those governors 
"to fill up all vacancies happening in the recess" of their respective 



40 

legislatures by teniporary appointments; so iliat ilicre exists no ground 
upon whicii to builJ »p a construction in fuvor of tlie power of the 
Federal Kxecutive, which does not equally sustain ihnt of the State 
Executive in each of these instances. Without further discussion 
of the principles connected with this subject, we might regard it 
as never to be shaken while the Constitution lasts, that the President 
alone can not fill any vacancy occasioned by the refusal of the 
Senate to concur in his nominations ; and that if he, having had a fair 
opportunity to consult his constitutional advisers, should refuse or neglect 
to do so in any case where their consent to the appointment is required, 
he has no power to supply the vacancy existing at the expiration of their 
session. 

Before I close my remarks upon the constitutional rights of the Presi- 
dent and Senate, suffer me to say, Sir, that there cannot be, in a free go- 
vernment, a noore dangerous principle than th^it of implied executive 
power. To control it, we cannot keep too steadily in view, that delega- 
ted authority of this character, should always be either strictly construed, 
or strictly defined, and that by the terms n\ the Cons'.itution power, 
not expressly ceded, is reserved to the people or the States. 1 shall be 
graMfi'^d to see some farther evidences than any yet developed, to make 
good the remark of the gentleman from Tenni^ssee, when he expressed 
his pleasure at beholding the administration majority of the American 
Senate " contending against all those doctrines which are calculated to 
increase the authority of men in olfice." We have also been informed, 
that we live in an age when STATfcl RIGH PS are the great objects ot 
regard — when a predominating party has taken them into its especial keep- 
ing — when the President himself is their grand protector — when our hearts 
shall be gladdened, and our eyes blessed with the glorious vision of a party 
in power no longer warping the Cor.stitulion frnm its legitimate con- 
struction to increase the strength of ilie Federal head, but paring down all 
forced implications of authnrits , and restoring to their piistine purity and 
vigour the sovereign and independent powers of the twenty four SCites. 
Such, we are told, Sir, is the primary object of modern reform. Cut the 
ezampio of this administration is a sad coinmeniary on so fme a text ; and 
the principles advanced in this debate to sustain it, sap the whole foHn- 
dation of these lofty pretensions. Reverencing, as I sincerely do, the con- 
stitntioual rights of the States, I view the avowed principles of the 
Exorntive as subversive of the most important powers of that very 
body where alone the States, as such, are represented. Rob the Senate of 
thesi , and of v\hat avail is their mere Legislative authority, when the very 
Jaws themselves are to bf passed upon by judges, and executed by ollicers, 
in whr>sc appointment they have substantially no concern ? An English 
King boa;>ted that while he could appoint the Bishops and Judges, he 
could have what religion and laws he j.Ieased ; and it was the opinion of 



47 

Roger Slicrnian, in advening to tliat remark, Uiat if the President was 
vested with the power of a[)poinlii)g to and removing from DtVice at his 
pleasure, like tlio Mnglish nxinarch, he could render himself desptnic : 
A blow at the rights i)( the Slates, is a blow ut the libHrtics of the people ; 
and whenever the period shall arrive for destroying the latter, the first aim 
will be to prostrate the powers of the former, in the Senate. Th'.se who 
framed the C'onstilulion foresaw this, and, so lar as human wisdom could 
guard against the evil, they provided fur it, by ordaining that no Slate shall 
ever be deprived of lier equal sulTrag •, in this body, by any change of 
Cimslituiion. Hie niur us alien cus esto f IKre lies the bulwark against 
consolidation of the governni' nt — the barrier for the pruteciion of the 
States against ihe encroachnienls of Executive power ; an 1 the American 
who shall succeed in breaking down thisdefmce, will bury in iis luiris the 
liberties, with the Conslilutioii of his country. The elTort to destroy it, ia 
order to be successful, will never be ntade in open and avowed hostility, 
but the first approaches of the enemy will be gradual, crafty, and disguis- 
ed. Many a Sempmnius will thunder " war to the knife's blade" against 
the foe whom he secretly encourages, until, by successive restrictittns upon 
the rights of the Senate, the salutary powers of the Slates are stolen 
imperceptibly away, and most probably under this very pretence of en- 
abling the Executive to see that the laws are faithfully executed. 

Let us now, Sir, briefly, in conclusion, while we commemorate the day 
which inducted our Cjjief Magistrate to office, review his admiiiistratioa 
of the past year, apply to it the test of these [-.rinciplcs, and calmly inquire 
whether any constitutional interposition of the Senate be requisite to check 
ihe abuses of power. This anniversary recalls the pledges of the inaug- 
ural address, to keep steadily in view the limitations as well as the extent 
of the Executive authority, to respect and preserve the rights of the 
sovereign memhrrs of our Union, to manage by certain searchiog opera- 
tions the public revenue, to observe a strict and faithful economy, to 
counteract that tendency to private and public profligacy which a profuse 
expenditure of money by the government is but too apt to engender, lo 
depend for the advancement of the public service more on the integrity 
and zeal of the public officers than on their numbers, and particularly to 
correct thL-sc abuses which, it was then charged, had brought the patronage 
of the f ederal government into ct)iiHict with the freedom of elections, 
and counteract those causes which had placed or continued power in 
unfaithful or incmupctent hands. The lateness of the hour warns me 
that I OMght not to trespass on your attention, by inquiring how far all 
these pledges have been redeemed ; and the examination of all the topics 
presented by such a general inquiry might lead me beyond the "exiguo fine" 
within which I am admonished that an American Senator should contino 
himself, whcu speaking of an American President. Cut it is true, and ought 
to be observed on this day, thai our public oiticcrs are increased in uum- 



48 

ber, and not diminished in salary; lliat the promised retrenchment has ter- 
minated in a recommendatiua to establish additional bureaus, with more 
public agents, and increased demands on the Treasury, to swell to an 
almost boundless extent the influence of the Executive by a general ex- 
tension of the la\v which limits appointmenisto four years, and by the es- 
tablishment of a government bank ; and that a general system of pro- 
scription for a manly exercise of the right of opinion, under the pretence 
of rotation in office, has brought the patronage of the Executive into full 
conflict with the freedom of elections. Turning from the investigt tinn oi 
minor subjects which niigiit by possibility be considered as mere topics for 
partisan effect, and with a nobler purpose than to subsiMvo the prtiy in- 
terests of any sect, or any party, our attention is forcibly arrest nd by 
some instances in which these pledges have been so violated, that their 
tendency, if not immediately, at least consequentially, and by the force of 
example, is subversive of the dearest interests of our people, and of iho 
most sacred institutions of our republic. 

When we look to the manner in which the pledge to observe a strict and 
faithful economy has been redeemed, we find the expenses of government 
increase, through the instrumentality of these rewards and punishments for 
political opinion. Outfits, salaries, and all the incidental expenses attend- 
ing the recall of nearly the whole of our diplomatic corjjs, and the ap- 
pointment of others to supply their places, have caused large drafts upon 
the Treasury, and laid the foundation for increasing demands upon it. 
But without dwelling to estimate how many tens, or hundreds of thou- 
sands of dollars have been expended in punishing rpponents, or inquir- 
ing how profusely the jiubiic bounty has been lavished upon tavourites, 
we have sometiiing more important to consider. We know that if funds 
for such purposes have been taken from the strongbox without appro- 
priations, the President must have dipped his hands into the nation's 
treasure in opposition to the Constitution, which it is our duty to support. 
Money cannot be drawn from the Treasury except in consequenie of 
appropriations made by law, and the radical act of the t'irst of JMay, 
1S20, after liiniling the powers of the President, in relation to transfers 
of appropriations in the Army and Navy, provides, in the filth section, 
" that no transfers of ap|)ropriation from or to other branches of expendi- 
ture shall thereafter be made." JMay we not inquire now, from what 
fund the money has been drawn to defray the greatly incr'^ased expenses 
of our foreign missions ? These expenses were not provided for during 
the last session of Congress by any law, f.ir they were not foreseen or 
r.nticipaled. If then tlie diplomatic fund was insinVioient for these pur- 
poses, either the nation has been brougiit in debt to accomplish them, or 
the Constitution and the law have been violated by unauthorized drafts on 
the Treasury. It is certain that we are now called upon to ajipropriate 
largely, cither to pay a debt incurred, or tu supply a deficiency in some 



49 

other fund not appropriated for these expenses. If the Executive can 
recall our foreign agents for parly purposes, or to promote friends, evca 
where no Legislative appropriation has been made for these objects, Con- 
gress has virtually no control over our foreign intercourse, and we may here- 
after expect that our ministers abroad will be vi'ithdrawn on the accession 
of every new incumbent of the Presidency ; that new men will be sent to 
supply their places, and that the whole relations of the country with 
foreign powers will be changed, or thrown into confusion, at the end of 
every four years. Admit the power of the Executive, without apfjropria- 
tiou, to recall and to appoint Ministers, and by the operation to bring the 
nation in debt, /or the public good, — yet show us how the public good re- 
quired this increased expense. Take a case for example, and let some 
ingenious advocate of the administration assign a reason why our late 
Minister near the Court of St. James' was recalled. Mr. Barbour had ac- 
quitted himself faithfully in every public trust which had ever before been 
confided to him, and was at the time of his recall discharging with honour 
to himself and his country the high duties of his mission. In what respect 
was he thought to be either incompetent or unfaithful ? Was any new 
policy to be adopted in our relations with England which he would not es- 
pouse ? Take another case, and inform us why the gallant Harrison, the 
hero of Fort Meigs, the victor at Tippecanoe, and the Thames ; a vete- 
ran in council, as well as in the field, distinguished for his virtues in all 
the relations of the citizen, the soldier, and the statesman — why, I ask, was 
he proscribed as unfit to represent his country abroad, and withdrawn from 
Colombia, to make room for Thomas P. Moore ? He had scarcely ar- 
rived at Bogota — the ink was still fresh on the Executive record which in- 
formed the President that it was the advice of the Senate that he should 
represent us there, when the order for his removal was announced. This 
could not have been done for any official misconduct. There had been no 
time to intjuire into that. Was his fidelity distrusted then ? Or how did 
the public good require his dismissal ? Think you it will tell well in the 
annals of history, that he who had so often periled life and limb, in the 
vigour of manhood, to secure the blessings of liberty to others, was punish- 
ed for the exercise of the elective franchise in his old age F Sir, it was aa 
act, disguise it as we may, which, by holding out the idea that he had lost 
the confidence of his country, might tend to bring down his gray hairs with 
sorrow to the grave. But the glory he acquired by the campaign on the 
Wabash, and by those hard earned victories fur which he received the 
warmest acknowledgments of merit from the Legislature of Kentucky, 
and the full measure of a nation's thanks in the resolutions nf Congress, 
can never be efi'aced ; and any ePort to degrade their honoured object will 
recoil on those who make it, until other men in better days shall properly 
estimate his worth, and again cheer his declining years with proofs of hii 
couatry's confidence and gratitude. If then these acis^ and otberi of » 
7 



50 

similar character, be hostile to the spirit of the Constitution, can we regard 
the expenditure of public money they have occasioned as a proper redemp- 
tion of those pledges which on this day last year so much delighted us, 
" to observe a strict and faithful economy, and to keep steadily in view the 
limitations as well as the extent of the Executive power ? 

The pledge to preserve the rights ef the sovereign members of our Union, 
as well as the defence of the administration made by the gentleman from 
Tennessee, lead us to ihe reflection that more members of Congress who 
were friendly to the election ef the present Chief Magistrate, have been 
appointed to office by him, within the compass of a single year, than liave 
been appointed by any other President during the whole course of 
an administration of eight years. The consequences of this were fore- 
seen and deprecated by the founders of our government ; but the provision 
which they inserted in the Constitution to prevent them has proved inade- 
quate to its object. Such was the opinion of a favorite constitutional law- 
yer, who, in an address to the Tennessee Legislature on the 7th of October, 
1825, explained this subject so fully that I shall be pardoned for pro- 
ducing a large extract from that valuable stale paper — especially after the 
gentleman from Tennessee has adverted to it, and made an argument upon 
it. " With a view," says he, " to sustain more efl'ectually in practice the 
axiom which divides the three great classes of power into independent con- 
stitutional checks, I would impose a provision, rendeiing any member of 
Congress ineligible to office under the general government during the term 
for which he was elected, and two years thereafter, except in cases of judi- 
cial office. The effect of such a constitutional provision is obvious. By it 
Congress, in a considerable degree, would be free from that connection with 
the Executive Department, which at present gives strong ground of ap- 
prehension and jealousy on the part of the people. Members, instead of 
being liable to be withdrawn from legislating on the great interests of the 
nation, through prospects of Executive patronage, would be more liberally 
confided in by their constituents; while their vigilance would be less inter- 
rupted by party feelings and party excitements. Calculations from intrigue 
or management would fail; nor would their deliberations or their investiga- 
tion of subjects consume so much time. The morals of the country would 
be improved, and virtue, uniting with the labors of the representatives, and 
with the official ministers of the law, would tend to perpetuate the honor anJ 
glory of the government. 

" But, if this change in the Constitution should not be obtained, and im- 
portant appoinimcnts continue to devolve on the representatives in Con- 
gress, it requires no depth of thought to perceive that corruption will be- 
come the order of the day ; and that, under the garb of conscientious sacri- 
fices to establish precedents for the public good, evils of serious importance 
to the freedom and prosperity of the republic may arise. It is through this 
channel that the people may expect to be attacked in their coostituiiooal 



51 

Bovereignty, and where tyranny may well be apprehended to spring up, in 
aome favorable emergency. Against such inroads every guard ought to he 
interposed, and none better occurs than that of closing the suspected 
avenue with some necessary constitutional restriction." 

It is interesting to examine how far this administration has actually prac- 
tised on these maxims. Why, within the very first year six members of the 
Senate,* being one eighth of the whole body as it was composed during the 
twentieth Congress, have been appointed to some of the most important 
offices within the gift of the Executive. And yet the message of this 
session reiterates the principles of the Tennessee letter, with a slight re- 
servation by way of covering the case as it now exists. By that letter 
j udges alone might be selected from the members of Congress. By the late 
message we are informed that " the necessity of securing in the Cabinet, 
and in diplomatic stations nf the highest ran^, the best talents and political 
experience, should perhaps (even here we have a quere) except these from 
the exclusion." If it be " perhaps" necessary to change the Constitution 
to save us from doing wrong, why not do right without the change ? The 
new reservation is a flat departure from the maxims of 1825, and still even 
that does not cover the acts of the Executive, for we have not only diplo- 
matists and cabinet ministers (important officers !) chosen from the mem- 
bers of Congress " within the term for which they were elected, and two 
years thereafter," but important appointments of a very different character, 
even in the Post Office and the cystoms, continue to devolve on them, con- 
vincing those who have become proselytes to the Tennessee doctrine, with- 
out any great depth of thought, that corruption may become the order of 
the day, and that, under the garb of conscientious sacrifices for the pubUc 
good, evils of serious importance to the freedom and prosperity of the re- 
public may arise. But tho gentleman from Tennessee, who called our 
attention to the letter, and without whose notice of it I should hardly have 
adverted to it, says — 

[Here Mr. Grundy explained. He stated that he bad alluded to 
the letter in reply to the Senator from Indiana (General NoBLt-j 

Mr. Clayton continued. Sir, the honorable gentleman's reply was, that 
the people ought to have changed the Constitution, but that, without some 
constitutional restraint, the President was under no obligation to practise 
what he formerly preached. However valid that defence may appear, it is 
not the opinion of my constitutional lawyer, for in that same letter he sayi, 
" It is due to myself to practise upon the maxims recommended to others." 
These, and similar pledges, obtained for him thousands of votes during tbc 
canvass of 1828, and ought to have been redeemed. 

" When the blood burnt, how prodigal (he loul 
" Leodi the loogue vowa." 

• Mr. Van Buren, Secretary of Slate ; Mr. Branch, St-cretary of the Navy ; Mr. Bsr* 
ri«n, Attorney General; Mr Eaion, Secretary of War; Mr. McLaoe, Minitterto Fogland- 
aad Mr. Chaadler, Cellector at Potilaad. 



62 

Moreover, It will require much " depth of ihoughi" to convince us tiiat 
a President cannot do what he thinks right without some coDStitutional 
restriction to prevent him from doing what he knows to be wrong; — or that 
a man of sound mind and good disposition cannot avoid the destruction of 
his own family, unless you treat him like a madman, by tying his arms and 
depriving him of the means of doing injury. 

There was, however, no pledge in the inaugural so striking or so impor- 
tant as the recognition of that obligation, then said to be inscribed on the 
list of Executive duties by the recent demonstration of public sentiment, 
to counteract those causes which brought the patronage of the General 
Government into conflict with the freedom of elections. Sir, your Post- 
master General, wielding the patronage of his Department over clerks, depu- 
ties, contractors and agents, in numbers amounting to nearly eight thousand 
men, has for political efiect removed from public employment, in pursuance 
of a general system, so vast a proportion of the old and faithful public ser- 
vants connected with that immense establishment, that its resources and its 
energies are impaired, public confidence is diminished, and suspicion, 
darkening this great avenue to light, as she spreads her dusky pinions over 
it, whispers that some of its recesses have been converted for political pur- 
poses into posts of espial on the private intercourse of your citizens. The 
public press, too, by the instrumentality of which alone this republic might 
be prostrated ; by the influence of which a President might be swelled into 
a Monarch, has been — not shackled by a gag-law — no. Sir, but subsidized 
by sums approximating to the interest on a million of dollars granted in the 
way of salaries, jobs and pensions to partisan editors, printers, proprietors, 
and all the host directly and indirectly connected with and controlling it. 
The appointment of editors to office is not casual, but systematic. They 
were appointed because they were Editors. In the days of the French 
Revolution, when the press was bought up with the public funds, the coun- 
try was flooded with envenomed effusions from the Jacobin prints. The 
post of profit was then erected in the kennel where a venal pack bayed 
like blood-hounds for murder. Marat was distinguished, as the Editor of 
a Revolutionary journal, for violence and vituperation; and having pub- 
lished his demand of two hundred and sixty thousand heads as a sacrifice 
to liberty, was soon tlevated to one of the highest offices of the Republic, 
where, as a member of the infernal triumvirate which deluged France in 
tears and blood, hp combined the cunning malice of Robespierre with the 
native ferocity of Danton. He was a compound of the vices of both his 
coadjutors— of all that on earth was flagitious, mean, inhuman and inex- 
orable ; for he came from the schools of a faction which trained its disci- 
ples to cry havoc without mercy when bounty lured them up the path to 
blood and death. The examples of that day teach us how easy is the 
transition from the hireling libeller to the brutal murderer ; and that he 
whose habits have long accustomed him to live upon the ruins of private 



53 

reputation, would shed the blood of his victim with pleasure, if paid to do 
the deed of death. An independent, able, liigh-minded Editor, is an honor 
to his country and to the age in which he lives. He is the guardinn of the 
public welfare, the sentinel of liberty, the conservator of morals ; and 
every attempt to allure or to coerce him to desertion from his duty should 
be regarded as an insult and an injury to the nation whose interests he is 
bound to defend. It is less manly in an assailant, and not less indicative 
of hostility, to bribe the sentry on the walls of your citadel, than to gag him 
and hurl him from its battlements. It is more dangerous to corrupt the 
press by the prospect of office, than absolutely to silence it by sedition laws ; 
because, although by the latter course it may be destroyed, yet by the 
former it may' be made the engine of tyranny. The charge of an 
undisguised efibrt to subdue its energies in the days of the elder 
Adams, brought down upon the heads of all who were friendly to the 
sedition act the full measure of public condemnation; and it yet remains to 
be seen what will be the efl'ect produced by an attempt to buy and prosti- 
tute it. We have a pack in full cry upon the trail of every man whose in- 
tegrity of purpose will not suffer him to bend before power; and friends, 
and character, and happiness, are torn from him by them, with as little re- 
morse as was felt by the blood-hounds of the old French litter. Can all these 
things be justified by the examples of the illustrious Jefiisrson ? Sir, his 
real friends will at all times spurn the imputation which the very question 
conveys. They will remind you that the first prominent act of his ad- 
ministration was to disembarrass and untrammel the press, to disengage 
that " chartered libertine" from the shackles of authority, and leave him 
free as mountain air. They will tell you that the great maxim he adhered 
to till the latest period of life, was, that "error of opinion should always 
be tolerated while reason was left free to combat it ,•" that he rewarded 
tho office hunting libeller who had slandered his predecessors with a view 
to gain by his election, with his unconcealed and unmitigated scorn and con- 
tempt — that he bought no man's services with gold, adopted no system of 
pensioning presses with office, offered no lures to libellers, employed no 
assassins of character. Three years ago, when the great Western Statesman 
who has, for his independence, been hunted like a wild beast, filled 
with honour to his country the office of Secretary of State, he became an 
object of the bitterest vituperation, by discharging some half a dozen prin- 
ters from the petty job of publishing the laws; and although the whole extent 
of this exercise of patronage^as it was then called, did not amount to more 
than a few hundred dollars, yet it was considered as an exertion of power 
vitally dangerous to the country, as tending to establish a government 
press. Such a press was said to be more alarming to the liberties of the 
people than a palace guard of six thousand men, and the acts of the Secre- 
tary were denounced, as being culculated to " sap the vigour, degrade the 
.independence, and enfeeble the vigilance of the sentinels on the watch- 



54 

tower of liberlT, whose beacon lights should blaze with purs and undying 
lustre." But now, when so many of those very sentinels have been subsi- 
dized by office, aad 'the new stipendiaries have formed in battalia about 
the throne, presenting their pikes, in clase array and forty deep, for its de- 
fence, the lofty eloquence of these patriot orators is heard no more within 
our walls ; their harps hang on the willows, and iustead of ringing an alarm 
through the land, they are hushed into the deepest silence, and the most 
tranquil repose. 

Mr. President, in this brief and hasty review of the prominent charac- 
teristics of the first year of this administration, we have observed those acts 
which in the opinion of the honourable member from Tennessee will have 
no more effect upon the American public than " an attempt to agitate the 
ocean by throwing pebbles on its surface." We find, however, that the 
removals to which he referred have not amounted only to the dismissal of a 
*' iew subordinate officers," but to a thorough revolution among the most 
important and most faithful functionaries of the government ; and it ought 
to be remembered that even the subordinate officers alluded to were freemen. 
I may know less of this world than the able and experienced member from 
Tennessee — but I still think this nation will look to an act of tyranny which 
tramples a faithful servant under foot, or turns him out with scoffs and con- 
tempt, however humble his condition may have been, with feel- 
ings very different from those manifested by the advocates of power. 
They may not care for the little salaries, — but they will look to ihe principle 
of Executive action — to the motive which makes that action danserous. 
Does the honorable gentleman recollect the reason for which John Hamp- 
den refused to pay the ship money ? The sum for which he contended 
amounted only te a few pence, yet the claim of a British monarch to it 
was resisted to the utmost ; and the feelings of an English public were 
agitated like the ocean in a storm, not on account of the sums to be paid 
under the illegal exaction, but because it was an encroachment on their 
rights, and an abuse of power. Every genuine American REruBLicAN 
carries the spirit of John Hampden in his bosom. Surely the honorable 
member's own high estimate of national character will not suffer him to 
entertain the degrading idea that an English public, under an English mon- 
arch, cherished a loftier sense of liberty, or a more determined spirit of 
resistance to the abuses of authority, than his own contrymen. Has he for- 
gotten the reason which induced our ancestors to resist the tea duties and 
the stamp tax ? Was it only the sum to be levied which set this continent 
in a flame, or was it the oppressive principle upon which those claims were 
founded? If the mal-adiuinistration of Executive power has been such as 
oven to " ezceed the conception^' of that great patriot whose opinions we 
both reverence so highly, why is it that the honorable member views with 
siicii contempt the sum of the salaries awarded to Executive partisans, and 
all the distress and anguish inllicted-on the sufferers by proscription, while 



55 

lie overlooks the principles whicli have been violated, and the Constitution 
which has been trampled under foot ? Here is the gruund on which ws 
have arraigned your administration; and altliough its friends may laugh its 
victims to scorn, they should recollect that what is theirs to day may 
shortly be in the puwer of another ; though they now consider this as 9% 
mere gossamer floating in the political atmosphere, and have even told us 
it is a feather which can weigh nothing with the People, they should recollect 
that this leather is torn from the plumage of the American Eagle, and that 
the trangrfssion which they now regard as so venial, may be a prece- 
dent to sanction the usurpation of power for the destructioo of the liberties 
of the People. 

Having closed my remarks io reply to honorable gentlemen, sufl'er me 
now to say, sir, that it has been no part of my object to embitter the feel- 
ings of my associates by personal allusions to them, although I have 
intended, upon the challenge of the gentlenjan from Tennessee, to speak 
out as ' boldly, frankly and freely,' as he might reasonably desire. But if 
any luckless arrow of mine, inadvertently shot, rankles in the bosom of 
any member here, he is welcome to send it back with his best force, pro- 
vided he does not poison its point. My objects, I trust, however, have been 
above such warfare. I have endeavored to preserve unimpaired the rights 
of the tribunal established by our forefathers as the only common umpire 
for the decision of those controversies which must arise in the best re£ru. 
lated political families, and to siiow that without the aid of such a tribunal 
we must sink back into that anarchy which, among all other nations and 
in all former ages, has been the sure harbinger of tyranny. I have labored 
to sustain what I believe to be the right and duty of the Senate — to inter- 
pose a barrier against the improper exercise of executive power which 
now controls, either directly or indirectly, nearly every avenue to every 
station, whether of honor or profit, within tiie gift of twelve millions of 
people. But if the sentiments which have been avowed by gentlemen o^ 
the majority on this floor should be supported by the American people, 
their giant party, which has already borne upon its shoulders a weight 
greater than the gates of Gaza, will, in the overthrow of both these objects, 
wrench the very pillars of the government from their foundations. Then 
we shall find how dreadtul are the consfquences of such doctrines. Upon 
their construction oi e>;ecutive po\»er, should one possessed of the temper 
and ability which have so often characterized riie Consuls and Chiefs of 
other republics, obtain the Presidency — such a man as >apoleon meant 
to describe when he spoke of ihe Russian " with a beard on his chin" — 
exercising, as he may, in the spirit of oriental despotism, perfect command 
ever ihf arniy, the navy, the [iress, and an overflowing treasury, the 
merest drivelitr may foreste that our liherlits aill fare like the " partridge 
in the falcon's clutch." The very sentinels of our freedom will be bribed 
by him, with our owq gold ; and even many of those who have so triumpi;- 



56 

antly borne aloft the stripes and stars amidst the thunders of battle, will 
be compelled to " beg bitter bread,'' or to turn the steel which we have 
placed in their hands, against our own bosoms. He will readily gain to 
his purposes a flock of those vor;icious ofTice hunters, whom we have seen 
■Roding over the spoils of victory after a political contest, like so many 
vultures after a battle, perched on every dead bough about the field, snuff- 
ing the breeze, and so eager for their prey that even the cries of the widow 
and the orphan cannot drive them from the roost. It has been 
said, and I believe truly, that we can never fall without a strug- 
gle; but in the contest with such a man, thus furnished by ourselves wiili 
" all appliances and means to boot" against us, we must finally sink. 
For a time our valleys will echo with the roar of artiller>, and our 
DOouniains will ring wiih the reports of the rifle. The storm of civil war 
will howl fearfully through the land, from the Atlantic border to the wildest 
recesses of the West, covering with desolation every field which has been 
crowned w'lh verdure by the culture of freemen, and now resounding with 
the echoes of our hap[)iness and industry. But the tempest must subside, and 
be succeeded by the deep calm and sullen gloom of despotism : — after 
which, the voice of a freeman shall never again be heard within our borders, 
unless in the fearful and suppressed whispers of the traveller from some 
distant land who shall visit the scene of our destruction to gaze in sorrow 
on the melancholy ruin. 

— ^Q© — 

NOTE BY THE PUBLISIIEII. 

" The Postmaster General, wlio, harmonizing with tliis Administration, has rctnc » 
within Llie last year, his thousand deputies, :it;ents and clerks, liionph vested by law wiik 
the express right of appointing them, can point you 10 no statute coulerring upon liiiii the 
right 10 remove one of them." — p. 'J3. 

Since the foregoing Speech w. is delivered, the following report has becD made to the 
Senate of the United States by the Postmaster tieueral. 

Post Ofuce Department, March 24, 1830. 
To the Hon. Joint C. CaLhoun. 

Sir : In obedience to a resolution of the Senate of the United States, passed March 2Cd, 
1830, directing me " lo inform the Senate of the number of Deputy Postmasters who have 
been removed since the 4iliof March last, designating the number in each State and Ter- 
ritory," 1 have the honor to report, that the whole number of Deputy Postmasters remov- 
ed, IJeivveeii the 4ih day of Mirch, 1829, and the J-d day of March, 1830, inclusive, is lour 
liundred and ninety-one ; and that the number ihcrcof in each State and U'crritory is a» 
follows : In .Maine fifteen, New Hampshire fifty five, \'erniont twenty two, MassacliusetH 
twenty eiuMit, Rhode /sland three, Coiin'-ciicul twenty, New York one hundred and thirty 
one, .New .Jersey fourteen, Pennsylvania thirty five, Delaware sixteen, Maryland fourteen, 
District of Cclumbia one, Virginia richt, North Carolina lour, Georgia two, Alabaniit 
two, iMississippi five, l.oMisiaiiH lour, lennessee twelve, Kentucky sixteen, Uhio fil'ty one, 
Indiana niiietccn, Illinois iliree, Missouri seven, Florida one, Arkansas two, and Michi- 
gttii one. I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servam, 

W. T. BARRY. 

The number dpsignaicd in the foregoing re|>ort, of removals in the Post Oftice Depart- 
ment, between March 4, 1829, and >Iarcli -2, ID.K), includes, it will be observed, Deputy 
Postmasters on/y. If the Clerks, Messengers and other Agents of th^ Department, who 
have been removed wiiliin the aforesaid period, were included, it would probably swell 
the aggregate of Post Ollice removals considerably above a thousand, the number stated 
l>y Mr. Clavto.n. . . ' 



ERRATA,— In page 8, line U, for 1799, read 1779. 3 9 If 

page 21, Udc 10, for " desseuicr," read dissrateK. W 



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